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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

MARCUSE'S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

by



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A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1971



THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and
recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance,
a thesis entitled
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submitted by Allan R. MacLeod
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts



ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a critique of Marcuse's concept of freedom, as a social science concept. In the first chapter, the concept is developed, with notice taken of problems of consistency in thought, and verification of assertions. In the second and third chapter, two problems identified in the first chapter are discussed in greater detail. In the second chapter the relation of freedom and needs is examined; and, in the third chapter the question of consciousness is discussed. The fourth chapter is introduced with a discussion of the criteria for a good social science concept. This is followed by an analysis of Marcuse's concept of freedom in light of the identified criteria. In the last chapter, it is concluded that with some revisions Marcuse's concept of freedom is a good concept for use in future freedom research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like that thank J.C. Wright for suggesting the topic, and especially for his encouragement and confidence. I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, Professor C. Bay and Professor A. Mardiros for the time they gave me in reading the thesis on such short notice and my thanks also to Mrs. Sharon Hackman for typing the thesis so well especially in such a short time and finally I would like to thank Cynthia Day for reading the thesis and pointing out needed corrections, and also for keeping me somewhat sane during the enterprise.

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CHAPTER I

In this chapter I shall examine critically Marcuse's concept of freedom as an abstract concept--abstract in the sense that the concept will only be considered as a "shell" or "form" without any substantive, "empirical" content or reference. There are at least eleven different ways in which Marcuse uses freedom--more, if one is willing to refine definitions even further than I have. Nevertheless, all these "definitions" of freedom are but aspects of one englobing concept, the dynamic unity of which is reason. For Marcuse, "Reason presupposes freedom.... Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason."¹ The two concepts of reason and freedom are not completely identical, however, for at least this point in history, for freedom is primarily concerned with the happiness of the individual, whereas reason involves domination of nature and of man with the sacrifice of happiness to that end.² Nevertheless, reason and freedom can be satisfied only when they are mutually compatible--in fact, intrinsically linked--rather than antagonistic to each other as they presently are. The present antagonistic character of reason and freedom is explored by Marcuse particularly in Eros and Civilization, so that it shall be left for discussion until the second chapter. Rather, in this chapter I shall examine only the ideal unity or identity of reason and freedom. To do this it will be necessary to examine Marcuse's concept of freedom in all its aspects, revealing the inner unity of what would appear to some as a careless and imprecise use of language.³

In Marcuse's early work--wherein he most generally deals with freedom as an abstract concept--there are at least eleven meanings he supplies for the concept of freedom, many of them overlapping, but nevertheless distinct. These eleven uses, which I will examine, are:

1. Freedom as reason and truth.
2. Freedom as self-consciousness, or an awareness of one's freedom to "negate" or criticize what is.
3. Freedom as the union of subject and object.
4. Freedom as the realization of one's potentials.
5. Freedom as the awareness of one's potentials.
6. Freedom as the overcoming of alienation.
7. Freedom as happiness.
8. Freedom as the overcoming of necessity.
9. Freedom as self-determination.
10. Freedom as the negation of limiting structures.
11. Freedom as community.

These eleven aspects can be further reduced to three general categories:

1. Freedom as the activity of the negating and self-willed subject.
2. Freedom as the end of antagonisms between the self and others.
3. Freedom as happiness, or the realization of one's potentials.

Reason unites all three of these categories, for reason is the conscious process of negation and transcendence--it is the mental expression of the freedom of man to change his world and his life style. But reason is universalistic in content; that is, it puts an end to antagonisms. It achieves such harmony by establishing that all men must realize their



potentials for existence.

Category two, which includes the union of subject and object, the overcoming of alienation, and community, resembles negative liberty, in that it specifically is dealing with the problem of the limits to our freedom that others might impose on us. As such, there is no difficulty in seeing that the second category must be a part of any concept of freedom. But with category one, which includes the consciousness of one's freedom, the power of negation, self-determination, and an awareness of one's potentials, and category three, which includes happiness and the realization of one's potentials, and the overcoming of necessity, there are problems both when they are considered individually and when they are considered together. Briefly the problem is that category one emphasizes the nothingness of man, whereas category three emphasizes a positive being for man--an essence. Two subsidiary problems, to which I will give considerable attention in the course of the development of this thesis, arise from this main problem. The first concerns the nature of consciousness and thought. Are they but a reflection of man's needs and environmental situation; or do they exist as a "pure" consciousness, independent of one's "existence"? One would be inclined to accept the latter alternative if one considered only category one. But then if man's consciousness is "pure" and therefore nothing, then how can man be endowed with a positive content or essence? This dilemma, the, is the first problem which I shall consider in the ensuing chapters. The second problem, although very similar, relates to the question of the inter-relationship of needs and freedom. Can one ever say that men need to be free, or that freedom is identical with need satisfaction, as Marcuse seems



to suggest in his third category of freedom? If so, does this not contradict the negative and transcendent aspects of freedom considered in category one? This dilemma defines the second problem in understanding Marcuse's concept of freedom. As I go through the eleven aspects of freedom, I shall point out these problems wherever they arise. But, in addition, I shall also emphasize the fundamental unity of the eleven concepts, for none can be said to by itself constitute freedom.

1. Freedom as Reason.

If one wishes to define freedom as reason, it is first necessary to provide a definition or meaning for reason itself. Here, it must be said at the outset, is one of Marcuse's major weaknesses. He tells us very often what it is that reason does, but he never tells us why it is that reason does those things. In his own terminology, reason becomes the subject of an infinite number of predicates, but reason itself is never seen, by his readers, to "pass over" into its predicates. However, to say that Marcuse does not explicate his notion of reason very well is not to say that his reasoning is faulty, or that therefore his concept of freedom is false. It is just to say that he is not a philosopher. Nor does it prevent us from evaluating the truth of his assertions--both conceptual and factual.

Reason, according to Marcuse, is both transcendent and immanent to this world. It is transcendent in that it points beyond what merely is to what could be; yet, it is immanent in the sense that it reflects nothing but real historical tendencies and realizable possibilities for man in society.⁴ Reason, as applied to an understanding of man and nature, attempts to uncover the realities, truths, or essences of the objects to

which it is applied.⁵ To say this of reason is to say automatically that it must be critical, for it transcends and negates what is. And to say that reason must be critical is to say also that it must exist in an atmosphere of real and genuine freedom of thought.⁶ But, even if reason presupposes freedom of thought, in what sense does freedom presuppose reason; or to put the question another way, if, as appears to be the case, there is freedom of thought in the Anglo-American democracies, how can Marcuse yet justify calling them both unfree and irrational?

To say that reason is necessarily critical is trivial, for all thought, insofar as it reflects on data, is critical. Therefore, there is no quarrel with Marcuse that thought or reason is critical or negative. What, however, must be shown, is that reason must necessarily negate what is, and point towards new "realities". Marcuse's defense of this transcendent, negative, or critical function of reason is largely based on a particular ontology and metaphysics. Reason, Marcuse will accept, is concerned with knowledge, or the pursuit of truth. Truth, however, involves an understanding of essences. But, Marcuse states, the truth of our world, and our own beings, is that, taken as a whole, they are contradictory, and thus reason necessarily becomes both critical and "utopian". In other words, the world is a mass of contradictory forces and tendencies, which have their own dynamic, so that any thoughtful person who comprehends the world in its totality must envisage its passing. The world is in a state of becoming,⁷ so that reason must follow that becoming "willy-nilly".⁸ Truth exists in the negation of what is, for what "is" is constantly evolving into what-it-is-not, so that a static truth--a truth which does not embrace reality beyond today--is falsified tomorrow.



Now obviously Marcuse is here involved in an ambiguous use of truth and essence. For the truth of what is is that it is contradictory, so that what is has another truth which is its "possibility" or "determinate negation" which exists beyond the contradiction. Marcuse expressly refutes the claim that existence and essence can be conceived as separate, so that Essence I and Essence II are both to be considered as essences;⁹ that is, what is cannot be described as existence, and what may be, described as essence. Marcuse then must have two different meanings for truth and essence, considering them both from two different points in time. It is precisely this double aspect of truth and essence--the description of what is, coupled with an offering of what could and even must be--that makes Marcuse's concept of reason both two-dimensional and critical.

Reason comprehends true Being. But of what does true Being consist? Marcuse does not believe that it exists behind or inside of an existent being--as he claims the phenomenologists and neo-Kantians believe--nor does he believe that true Being or essence exists outside of, or above, an existent being--as did Plato and the neo-Platonic Christian philosophers. Rather true being consists in the unfolding of the real potentialities of an existent being.¹⁰ But just what exactly that expression may mean requires some explanation.

Existence may be conceived of as a war, or as a balance of power, or as a resolution of forces, for "every being is the synthetic unity of antagonistic conditions,"¹¹ or:



The existence of things is 'the unrest of something in its Limit; it is immanent in the Limit to be the contradiction which sends Something on beyond itself'.... Being is continuous becoming. Every state of existence has to be surpassed; it is something negative, which things, driven by their inner potentialities, desert for another state, which again reveals itself as negative, as limit.¹²

In other words, any being is as a force which exists in opposition to other forces which seek to negate it. At a physiological level, it is, for example, my vital forces resisting various other forces, such as gravity and illness which give me my physiological existence. At the level of "personality" it is my struggle to gain the acceptance of others of my being which finally defines my being. The success of totalitarianism is dehumanizing people indicates that our identities are very much linked to the way in which people treat us. We can be dehumanized at a consciousness level, or we can suffer from crises of identity, if people fail to respond to us as we would have them do. In other words, my identity is strongest when my environment (social and natural) responds in a positive manner to my existence.¹³ But, instead, the environment is frequently negative; it restricts me in my mode of existence. Nature limits me through needs, scarcity, and "acts of God"; men limit me through acts or processes of domination and exploitation. Marcuse suggests that "everything must be understood in relation to other things, so that these relations become the very being of that thing."¹⁴ But it is not the case that we merely suffer our existence, for these relations must be seen as created by the object's own movement. The object must be understood as one that itself establishes and 'itself puts forth the necessary relation of itself to its opposite.'.... The object, in other words, must be comprehended as a 'subject' in its relations to its 'otherness'.¹⁵

Existence is a process--a developing--or an unfolding:¹⁶

Though every living being is determinate and limited, it can supersede its limitations by virtue of the power it possesses as a living subject. Life is at first a sequence of determinate 'objective' conditions--objective because the living subject finds them outside of its self, limiting its free self-realization. The process of life, however, consists in continuously drawing these external conditions into the enduring unity of the subject. The living being maintains itself as a self by mastering and annexing the manifold of determinate conditions it finds, and by bringing all that is opposed to itself into harmony with itself. The unity of life, therefore, is not an immediate and 'natural' one, but the result of a constant active overcoming of everything that stands against it. It is a unity that prevails only as a result of a process of 'mediation', between the living subject as it is, and the objective conditions.¹⁷

The fundamental antagonism involved in existence is therefore between a strong positing subject of being, and the limiting "other", or the objective conditions of being. Essence, or true being, is most easily conceived as the realization of the subject as it wills itself, or the transcendence and mastering of the objective conditions of existence, such that they no longer act as a limit to existence. In this sense, essence is a flowering into existence, rather than a hidden inner reality. It is important to note here that insofar as being exists in and against its other, that any limits on behaviour coming from the other constitute a negation of one's true being. Thus, the emphasis in this case is put on negative thinking--on the negation of the negating existing structures.

As Marcuse puts it:

The liberating function of negation in philosophic thought depends upon the recognition that the negation is a positive act: that-which-is repels that-which-is-not and, in doing so, repels its own real possibilities.¹⁸



But how do reason, freedom, and essence link up? Reason is the human instrument for establishing the truth of a "bad" reality--that is, it reveals reality as negating and limiting. This is the essential critical function of reason. But on the other hand, reason also establishes and defines real potentials for human existence, as well as for nature. Reason is to "organize reality"¹⁹ because reason can attain truths about man and nature which "could lead beyond the brute fact of what is, to the realization of what ought to be."²⁰ Truth is equivalent to the "fulfillment of the potentialities inherent in reality."²¹ Reason is so important to both freedom and essence because the world is only potentially rational, for at this moment it is irrational, and the agent of rationality is none other than the rational man. At least as applied to social organization, "the rationality of the thinking subject is the ultimate basis for the rational organization of society."²² In discussing the question of the supposed determinism in Hegel's philosophy of history--and this can apply to Marx' material determinism as well--Marcuse points out that:

A set of historical tendencies becomes a law only if man comprehends and acts on them. Historical laws, in other words, originate and are actual only in man's conscious practice, so that if, for instance, there is a law of progress to ever higher forms of freedom, it ceases to operate if man fails to recognize and execute it.... Progress depends on man's ability to grasp the universal interest of reason and on his will and vigor in making it a reality.²³

It must not be forgotten that existence involves not merely objective conditions, but a union of subject and object. Therefore, essence cannot be realized without the intent--the thrust--of the subject being itself rational. We shall return to a discussion of this problem in the next section. It is of major importance for it involves the old debate



about determinism and free will which always re-occurs with any discussion of the dialectic method--especially the Marxist materialist dialectic. Insofar as Marcuse is accused slightly by some of being an exponent of the metaphysical (non-scientific) mystifications of the Young Hegelians because of his emphasis on man or the subject, it is important to discuss the relationship of subject and object further.²⁴ In any case, even the strictest determinists are agreed that action must be informed with proper theory, which necessitates the use of reason.²⁵ Yet the question remains of just how reason does what it is supposed to do.

Proper reason is subject to two evaluative criteria; it must be of a universal nature in application; and it must involve a "determinate negation". Reason is universal insofar as it is "the veritable form of reality in which all antagonisms of subject and object are integrated to form a genuine unity and universality."²⁶ But reason is also determinate, for it begins with the "unity which underlies the (existing) antagonisms," in order to reconcile those antagonisms "in a true unity."²⁷ Reason combines these two criteria in the "notion" or the "concept", for the notion is both universal and determinate at the same time. The notion as determinate is relatively easy to understand and accept. The notion implies a transcendence of the limiting and contradictory nature of existence towards a new unity of subject and formerly opposed object, wherein both achieve a fuller development of their potentialities.²⁸ In this way the notion must be universal as well, for both subject and object--which is also a subject in its own right--are freer as a result. But is this a wish or a fact? Marcuse provides no satisfactory answer to that question. Part of the difficulty in understanding Marcuse is his attempt to stretch

the power of reason too far without explaining how. While it is certainly the case that man is mastering nature, it is happening only with a frightful expense to nature. Of course, inasmuch as man is a part of nature, he hurts himself when he injures nature, as for example when he upsets the ecological balance of nature, so that Marcuse may be right that our notions of true being must be in harmony with the growth potentials of nature, rather than being merely personal or destructive in intent. The problem of man's domination of man is, however, of more relevance to this thesis and perhaps easier to deal with. The question is basically one of indicating in what sense Machiavelli's Prince may be said to be irrational. In other words, why must reason recognize the universality of human rights and human freedom? Why cannot reason be merely self-interested?

But in order to answer this question we must first understand the universalistic notion of man, for indeed, "there is such a universal reality as man...and this universal in fact makes for the existence of every individual man."²⁹ The universality of man is in his man-ness--his potentialities as a man.³⁰ What these potentialities are Marcuse leaves largely unspecified, for they are determinate; that is, they are not eternal, but are related to the real conditions of man and society at a given point in time. But while it is true that man can be a creator, for example, it is also true that man can be an oppressor. Certainly an oppressor denies the universality of man in that he denies others that which he appropriates to himself--freedom, for example--but is not that oppressor free in fulfilling his potential as an oppressor? To get out of this dilemma, Marcuse relies on the famous Hegelian master-slave dialectic.³¹ According to this argument, a man who keeps another

man in bondage is not himself free, for he is dependent upon that other, must hold himself in relation to that other in such a way as to ensure the continuance of his dominance, and thus is forced to restrict his own actions. The master is, in other words, caught in a highly structured relationship which leaves him little opportunity to play with his potentials. This argument may be generalized to an assertion that if just one man is denied his human potentials by all others, then the resentment felt by that one man will necessitate a specific comportment on the parts of others in relation to him. An extreme case of this is to be seen in South Africa where the Whites, in order to maintain their dominance over the Blacks, are enslaved by the laws of apartheid as much as the Blacks. They cannot have T.V., or go to hear Black musicians, for example.

In the universality inherent in the concept of man lies the link of reason and freedom, for:

man's very nature lies in his universality. His intellectual and physical faculties can be fulfilled only if all men exist as men, in the developed wealth of their human resources. Man is free only if all men are free, and exist as 'universal beings.' When this condition is attained, life will be shaped by the potentialities of the genus, Man, which embraces the potentialities of all individuals that comprise it. The emphasis on this universality brings nature as well into the self-development of mankind. Man is free if 'nature is his work and his reality,' so that he 'recognizes himself in a world he has himself made.'³²

Marcuse is in effect saying that the world is at present irrational, but may be created rational if men exercise proper reason. Man is reasonable when he acts in such a way as to realize his own truth, which is equivalent to realizing his potentials. The result of such an exercise of reason is a rational and free world in which all people and things have realized their truths, for as Marcuse tries to establish, for man to

realize his own truth he must also realize those of other men and nature. Reason constructs "a universe that (is) rational precisely to the extent that it (is) dominated by the intellectual and political power of the individual. Truth (springs) from the subject."³³ Society must be judged, then, according to the degree to which it limits or aids the development of the human potentials of all men. The realization of one's potentialities is precisely man's freedom. Therefore, "reason terminates in freedom, and freedom is the very existence of the subject."³⁴ The universal quality of man--man's potentials--is his freedom.

At the beginning of this section it was suggested that Marcuse's concept of reason was poorly explicated in his own work, but that that fact did not necessarily invalidate the truth of his assertions. I have tried to explain the conceptual links involved in Marcuse's concept of reason, but the explanation is itself rooted in Marcuse's own work. Basically, his concept of reason is based on his particular ontology and metaphysics. The truth of his ontology--that what is is constantly evolving or passing over into its other--is perhaps an empirical question. Marcuse's article in which he attempts to demonstrate how liberalism evolved into fascism is evidence that in fact things do change into their others.³⁵ So, I will argue later, is our inability to get a "hold" on a definition of democracy.³⁶ Thus I feel that there is a lot to be said in support of his ontology and therefore his concept of reason. For reason to take a hold of truth, it must be critical of what is in light of real possibilities for a genuinely stabler existence. Reason must first make the world reasonable, before it can become uncritical of reality.

But still, doubts about the ontology remain. Reason is only able to establish universal notions of truth on the basis of the claim that

men inevitably develop their potentials. But what is it that requires men to strive for universal peace, harmony, and self-realization? By what standard is the capitalist irrational? Marcuse argues, as for instance in "Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,"³⁷ that even the most rationally organized society must eventually be construed as contradictory in light of its own purpose; monopoly capitalism, which is a rationally organized effort in the pursuit of profits, is irrational at its limits, which are private ownership, and the separation of the worker from his means of labor.³⁸ But, even given this, there are at least two choices to resolve this contradiction offered by Marcuse. One is to install an authoritarian leader at the head of the state;³⁹ the other is to adopt the Socialist alternative, which in this case is the "universalistic" solution. By what right can reason choose between the two? I suggest that it cannot, nor can Marcuse prove that reason must accept the universal solution, except with the additional assumption that the end of human existence is and will be human emancipation. In other words, reason does not end in freedom; but rather freedom is only realized through freedom--through the choice for freedom. Because, too, there are always at least two solutions to every contradiction, the intentions--the consciousness of purpose--of human actors becomes decisive for the realization of freedom. Marcuse is wrong if he is in Reason and Revolution trying to give scientific status to the demands for human freedom.

The problem then that Marcuse leaves unresolved, and which we will have to examine later, is whether in fact reason must necessarily end in freedom, defined as the realization of "true being". Certainly reason

must be negative, for the world is in flux--it is constantly negating itself. But beyond that, must reason pursue a new totalization, a new synthesis "willy-nilly", or is choice prior to reason? Is reason only capable of negative thinking, of destroying the status quo, but incapable finally of choosing a new future? If this is the case, then how can Marcuse justify the centrality of his concept of freedom, for men could always choose not to be free? Indeed, can reason even be said to establish truth, if the future of man is beyond its control insofar as choice is prior to any act? These questions all refer back to the question of the independence of consciousness, and we shall try to answer them in Chapter III.

2. Freedom as Self-Consciousness; or an Awareness of One's Ability to Negate

In this section, our discussion will largely be tacitly centered about a critique of MacIntyre's critique of Marcuse as a Young or Left Hegelian in that he (Marcuse) makes "'Man' rather than 'men' the subject of history."⁴⁰ I think that MacIntyre is rather closer to the point when he suggests that Marcuse's error is that "he treats Hegelian theory and even the Marxist version as providing us with a standard of rationality against which the actual world must be judged,"⁴¹ for Marcuse nowhere suggests that "Man" makes history, but he does say that the real world must be measured against Man's potentials and its success in permitting their fulfillment. But Man's potentialities include the freedom of all individual men, so it is difficult to see just how MacIntyre's criticism is a criticism at all. The change from the Left Hegelians to Marx is described by Althusser as a change in "problematic".⁴² Marx became less

metaphysical and more scientific; he became a dialectic materialist. In other words, Marx abandoned the abstract ontology and metaphysics of the Left Hegelians in order to describe and critique the existing world. Marx no longer interpreted history as the overcoming by man of his own alienation; instead he realized that history was made by men with definite needs and interests. This meant, in other words, that men had to act in a knowing way to overcome their alienation, and Marx, after his change, was primarily concerned with giving men that critical knowledge which was necessary to success. Therefore, behind the Marxist critique of capitalism lies a concern with Man and men. The change between Marx and Marcuse is not in the problematic, but rather, in the focus of study. Marcuse is fundamentally a sociologist, exploring the ways in which social forces both limit men, and are irrational in themselves. Marcuse additionally reintroduces so much of the language of Hegel largely because the old fundamental concern of socialism with humanity seemed to be threatened. It was necessary to return to the roots of scientific socialism in order to rediscover the interests which had permeated the work of the founders of scientific socialism. Science must be informed by values; it cannot pose its own problems, and then arrive at a unique correct solution. Marcuse believes, on the basis, for example, of the failure of Germany to become socialist after the defeat of the Nazis, that history is made by the intentions of men, and not merely according to objective conditions.⁴³ Furthermore, a "pure" critique of monopoly capitalism suggests as a solution state capitalism, especially as modern technology makes centralized control possible. Therefore, it appears that the socialist alternative to state capitalism can only be defended in light of the real needs and potentials

of man.

Men, to be free, must knowingly assert themselves in their environment; otherwise, they remain subject to necessary laws. Marcuse claims that:

Marx considered society to be irrational and hence evil, so long as it continued to be governed by inexorable objective laws. Progress to him was equivalent to upsetting these laws, an act that was to be consummated by man in his free development.⁴⁴

In other words, human development has to be achieved consciously by men; determinate objective laws cannot liberate men. Therefore, an essential part of freedom is the consciousness of freedom, and an awareness of its possibility for realization. Or to put it another way, in order to be free, one must first reason in the Marcusean fashion.⁴⁵

If men can be free only in the flowering of their potentialities, then it follows that "man can be free only when he knows his potentialities."⁴⁶ "Thought (1) lifts men beyond their particular determinations, and (2) also makes the multitude of external things the medium for the subject's development."⁴⁷ A free being must be one who feels himself to be determining his own existence, for otherwise it would not be himself whom he recognizes in his environment, his work, and his human relations, but rather some force behind him, whether it be God, wages, the State, or the natural environment.

The highest form of development is reached only when self-consciousness exercises mastery over the whole process. The life of the thinking subject is the only one that may be called a self-realization.... The thinking subject 'produces itself, expands itself actually to what it always was potentially.' And it achieves this result in so far as every particular existential condition is dissolved by the potentialities that are inherent in it and transformed into a new condition which fulfills these potentialities.⁴⁸

In his later writings, Marcuse has insistently repeated the need for a consciousness of freedom as a prerequisite for freedom itself, which is one of the reasons why he places such importance on the self-conscious student left.⁴⁹ In one article Marcuse suggests that:

self-government in the enterprises, in the factories, in the shops, can be a liberating mode of control only if a liberating change in the controlling groups themselves has occurred.... Once this process of self-government has started without a change in the subjective conditions, we may get the same, only bigger and better.⁵⁰

But as I have already pointed out on several occasions, just what this consciousness of freedom involves is not at all well explained by Marcuse. It is difficult to say if consciousness, mind, or thought, is only to function as a knowledge of one's real physical life possibilities, in which case mind is just a reflection--a critical comprehension--of body or experience; or if consciousness is a world onto itself which can determine the possibilities for man independently of the individual's previous experience; that is, his determinate conditions. But we must leave this question for later consideration.

3. Freedom as the Union of Subject and Object

"A perfect union of subject and object is a prerequisite to freedom. The union presupposes a knowledge of the truth, meaning thereby a knowledge of the potentialities of both subject and object."⁵¹ To say that for freedom to exist, the subject and object must be perfectly united, is not to say that they must be identical, but rather that together they complement each other, rather than contradict each other. Rather than the object acting as a limit to the free development of the subject, it responds affirmatively to the subject, supporting it in its attempts to

realize itself. The object world is no longer experienced by the subject as being hostile to its endeavours, an enemy to be conquered and appropriated, but rather the subject experiences it as sympathetic. But, in turn, the object will only be supportive if it too is being supported; that is, only if the subject recognizes the object's potentials and is sympathetic to them, will the object respond sympathetically to the subject. Thus, the subject and the object are united in support of each other, rather than linked through domination. The subject-object distinction ideally disappears, in fact, for the subject fulfills his potentials only through fulfilling the potentialities of the other at the same time. Thus a tie of sympathy--or a continuum of sympathy--dissolves the barrier between subject and object. Marcuse does not believe that this perfect union can ever be achieved, yet he sees it as a goal towards which men must work.⁵²

4. Freedom as the Realization of One's Possibilities

Freedom is the realization of one's "real" potentials.⁵³ But why so? The liberals would suggest that freedom consisted in being "left alone"; and that while this may provide the environment in which one could realize one's potentials, yet that in itself is not the definition of freedom.⁵⁴ However, what does being "left alone" involve? To answer that question would be to practically rewrite most of Marcuse's later work. So one must approach the link between freedom and the realization of one's potentials in a different way. To be free is to unrestricted in one's behaviour. To have a "real" possibility is to have the possibility for an alternative form of behaviour. If anything is preventing the realization of that possibility, then one is unfree. Therefore, freedom

is the ability to realize one's possibilities. But that is not what Marcuse has said freedom is; freedom is the actual realization of one's potential.⁵⁵ Somehow, Marcuse has made a leap. He seems to try to cover the leap by means of 1) an empirical assertion about the nature of man--he assumes that men want to be happy, and that happiness consists in the realization of one's possibilities, and that therefore men will want to realize their possibilities only if they are allowed to--and 2) an ontological assertion--namely, that existence is a becoming, and that therefore there is some sort of innate tendency for men to realize their truths, or their potentials. However, on both counts Marcuse seems to be inconsistent. In the first case, in One Dimensional Man he seems to suggest that men can be content without realizing their potentials; and in the second case, Marcuse also accepts the fact that it is possible for men not to know their potentials. In other words, men experience no compulsion to move beyond what they are--even in thought.

However, one does not want to abandon Marcuse in this position. Perhaps the link between freedom and the realization of one's potentials can be established in another way. To the extent that any person fails to realize his potentials, it if is possible for him to do so, he is limiting the freedom of the other to realize his potentials. Let us say, for instance, that A does not particularly care to become an artist, so that he does not, as a result, feel compelled to demand an end to the system which denies him a means for becoming an artist. A has a real possibility to create, to express himself and his feelings, in art. Under our present social conditions, his failure to push for the necessary means to attain his goal in turn restricts B who does want to create. Without

A's support, B cannot force a change in the system. He must abide by the status quo, and suffer his denial. Now B's freedom is restricted because under the present social conditions A does not choose to realize his potentials. But now A's freedom is restricted, because the necessity of keeping B in line requires him to act in a certain way towards B. Let us say that A wants to be friendly with B, or wants B to do something for him, then B would either be resentful and refuse A, or he might first demand that A change his attitude. In either case, A's freedom has been limited. Thus, by returning to the subject-object union aspect of freedom, one can establish that freedom does in fact entail the realization of one's potentials. This also shows that it is impossible to discuss freedom as one single aspect.

But it should be noted here that this, the first of the more "positive" category of aspects to be discussed, is very inadequately proven. Insofar as the positive aspect of freedom is related to the claim that reason establishes "true being", and insofar as this claim is in doubt, these inadequacies in proof of the positive aspects may indicate that Marcuse is on very weak ground in defining freedom as the realization of a being, rather than merely defining it as the more negative freedom to realize any being. We shall return to this in Chapter V.

5. Freedom as the Awareness of One's Possibilities

Even if it were the case that freedom is not identical with the realization of one's potentials, yet freedom, to be genuine, does require that people perceive real possibilities for themselves. In other words, freedom presupposes choice, and choice exists only with an awareness of at least one potential for existence other than the present one. An

awareness of real possibilities for existence is a part of consciousness, but it is different from consciousness as discussed earlier, in that in the prior case, consciousness was identical with knowing how to realize a potential for existence, and knowing that one could abandon an old life style, rather than with having a conception of a potential for existence. But obviously the two aspects are very closely related.

6. Freedom as an End to Alienation

There are three principal types of alienation--alienation from self, which involves a detachment from one's own self such that one is unaware of better possibilities for existence for one's self; alienation from others, such that the individual is not confirmed in his existence by the positive reactions of others; and finally, alienation from non-human objects in the environment, such that the world does not acknowledge one's existence, but rather hinders and denies it, or acknowledges the pre-eminence of extra-human forces instead. All three types of alienation relate to the same problem of confirming one's existence.

They are analytically distinct, but in fact are inseparable.⁵⁶ Alienation from self, for instance, is promoted by the failure of one's environment to acknowledge the existence of the self-actor. The individual comes to feel that he is the pawn of nature or other men, and thus he loses a feeling of identity--of personal possibilities--but instead resigns himself to a condition of pawn-ness or honourable servitude.

"Man is free if 'nature is his work and his reality, so that he 'recognizes himself in a world he has himself made.'"⁵⁷ Alienation differs from the subject-object union in the sense that in the latter case the problem is one of an unco-operative environment, whereas in the former

case the environment denies the person his "person". Alienation exists when the environment is not recognized by an individual as being himself; that is, when he does not have a sense of achievement in producing his environment which reflects upon his potentials and abilities. Much attention has been paid to the alienating effect of the modern labour process. When men produce, yet do not have the feeling of having created, they do not become aware of their creative, artistic, and imaginative faculties. The automobile worker does not experience the finished product as his, so that he feels no desire to want to develop artistic potentials in developing, let us say, a new car design, or motor, or whatever.⁵⁸ A piece of work, in which the creator has put all his abilities, exists as a continual challenge to the creator to be improved upon or surpassed. Thus, it demands that the individual discover his potentials and develop them.

The relations of an individual with other humans is similar to one's relations to the inanimate world, only they are more important. The response of others to an individual can have a shattering effect on human beings. For some, like Richard Sennett, this shattering can eventually be creative, in that from the ruins of the old identity may emerge an awareness of other and perhaps better forms of existence.⁵⁹ The human dialogue can be an important source for an awareness of potentials for existence. The other can force individuals to reach beyond their present limits. But, on the other hand, the other can just as easily dehumanize the individual. By failing to respond to an individual as a human being--by treating him like a number--he does not confirm the individual for what he is, or suggest creative alternatives for existence. Rather, the

other makes the individual feel like a number. The other acts as a mirror, in which we may be reflected for good or ill, but when the mirror fails to reflect anyone--when it even fails to reflect a person's faults--then that person becomes non-existent. Other people are perhaps the most important factor in one's growth.

If freedom is both an awareness of one's potentials and the realization of one's potentials, then the link between alienation and freedom is readily apparent. A person leading an alienated existence has neither any idea of what potentials he may have, nor does he know that he may in fact be realizing a potential. Only if a man is able to recognize work as his own, and then criticize it; and relate to people as a whole personality and be reflected by them--criticized, pushed and pulled--will he be able to develop an awareness of himself, and his potentials.

A less difficult (to comprehend), but equally essential aspect of alienation, is the fact that the alienated person is simply not in possession of a medium in which to develop his potentials. He is, in other words, alienated from his "means of realization."

Labor in its truest form is a medium for a man's true self-fulfillment, for the full development of his potentialities; the conscious utilization of the forces of nature should take place for his satisfaction and enjoyment.⁶⁰

But, if the means of labour are possessed by someone else, then the individual must do what the owner wants done with the scarce means; the individual may not do what he himself would like to do. Insofar as someone else determines what a person will do with his labour, then the labourer is not realizing his potentials. This aspect of alienation is more like a subject-object disunion in that the alienating aspect in this case is the domination of one person by another; "individuals are isolated

from and set against each other," rather than co-operating in the realization of each other's potentials.⁶¹

7. Freedom as Happiness

Certainly this identification of freedom and happiness is one of the most contentious of all Marcuse's aspects of freedom. For various reasons, people such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Edward Andrew are disturbed by Marcuse's association of freedom with happiness. As MacIntyre expresses it: "The acceptance of freedom as a goal is the acceptance of the possibility that in utilizing their freedom men will produce situations which invoke frustration, sacrifice, and unhappiness."⁶² The criticism, it appears, however, is based on a different definition of happiness than that offered by Marcuse. MacIntyre seems to be associating happiness with an absence of pain, which Marcuse would be inclined to term a false happiness, or at least not a genuine happiness.⁶³ MacIntyre, if he does identify happiness with the absence of pain, is ignoring the Aristotlean definition of happiness as "an activity of the soul in conformity with perfect goodness,"⁶⁴ which stresses activity above pleasure, and in particular that activity which realizes human potential. MacIntyre seems only to be associating happiness with sensual pleasure (or pain), but Marcuse points out that this association has occurred because previously it has been the case that only in the sensual world--or the world of the soul--⁶⁵ have men been allowed some freedom to be happy. But happiness in the work world would be very different from happiness in the sensual world.⁶⁶

For Marcuse, the "'realm of freedom'...conveys the image of the unfettered satisfaction of the human faculties and desires, thus suggesting the essential identity of freedom and happiness which is at the core

of materialism."⁶⁷ Whether or not Marx identified the two, as Marcuse claims,⁶⁸ and which MacIntyre denies,⁶⁹ is beside the point, which is that Marcuse identifies the two. Happiness is "the fulfillment of all potentialities of the individual," and as such it "presupposes freedom: it is freedom."⁷⁰ Happiness is the true interest of individuals, and "the true interest of individuals is the interest of freedom."⁷¹ If a person is not satisfying his true interests, then his happiness is false.⁷² The true interest of a person is determined through his use of reason, and the truth of human interests and needs is that they are "of such a sort that their gratification can fulfill the subjective and objective potentialities of individuals."⁷³

Whatever definition of happiness one would employ, freedom is an essential part of it, for freedom means the right to do whatever one wants, including that which makes one happy. To be happy, one must be free to be happy. But does freedom necessarily end in happiness, even given Marcuse's definition of happiness? Marcuse tries to argue that it does, on the grounds that happiness is the gratification of an individual's true interests, which corresponds to his true needs and potentials.⁷⁴

At this point we come to the same problem that we faced earlier with the identification of freedom with the realization of one's potentials. If that association holds true, then Marcuse is right in asserting that "conceptual analysis reveals them (freedom and happiness) to be ultimately identical."⁷⁵ But certainly the connection of the two is in need of further elaboration. Again, one should note that this more positive aspect of freedom is very poorly proven.

8. Freedom as the Overcoming of Necessity

The identification of freedom with the negation of necessity is almost tautological, except that Marcuse describes the relation between the two in two different ways. The first way is in the normal sense-- freedom exists beyond necessity. But in addition Marcuse also refers to freedom in the realm of necessity itself. He definitely rejects the idea that freedom and necessity might be identical, however.

Necessity in terms of human activity and development means that a person has no choice as to what he can do or become. Marcuse warns against adopting the Sartrean notion that men always have choice, even if that choice is to be, or not to be.

If philosophy, by virtue of its existential-ontological concepts of man or freedom, is capable of demonstrating that the persecuted Jew and the victim of the executioner are and remain absolutely free and masters of self-responsible choice, then these philosophic concepts have declined to the level of a mere ideology.... The free choice between death and enslavement is neither freedom nor choice, because both alternatives destroy the '*réalité humaine*' which is supposed to be freedom.⁷⁶

A man's choice, then, can be limited when a "vital" need is involved; that is, when one of the alternatives is death or injury to one's being, then there is no real choice at all, for to choose death or injury is to remove the ground for choosing in the first place.⁷⁷ So freedom can only exist when needs have been satisfied, so that needs no longer determine a man's behaviour by removing the possibility of choice. But men, in order to be free, must also be beware of adopting false needs-- of feeling that they must do something about which they may actually have a choice. Even if one believes that men must realize their potentialities to be free, and that needs and potentials are identical, so

that need satisfaction and freedom are identical, it is still possible for men to ignore some needs to satisfy unreal or false needs. If one adopts the Maslowean hierarchy of needs, one can suggest that men might be trapped in a lower level of need satisfaction by continuing to satisfy the lower needs when they have already been sufficiently satisfied, thus preventing them from realizing their other potentials and needs. But how does one distinguish between a true and false need? To say that the former develops men's potentialities seems simply to be not sufficient, for presumably all need satisfaction does that, in however a perverse manner. I would suggest that a false need is a means of satisfying a need that has become a need itself. Thus, in the cold Edmonton climate one needs warm clothing in order to survive. But one does not need a mink coat in order to satisfy that need. One cannot need a mink coat. False needs answer to genuine needs, but they are not in themselves needs.

But does Marcuse accept this "internal" triumph over needs or necessity as a prerequisite or characteristic of freedom? It appears not, as he tends to identify needs and potentials, which can never be overcome. So, is his concept of freedom really a concept of freedom? Is Marcuse in the last analysis a determinist; men must be free, unless they are prevented from being so? This question reoccurs with consideration of Eros and Civilization where he also seems to be suggesting that men are determined by their instincts. Yet, on the other hand, Marcuse stresses negativity and consciousness so much in connection with freedom, that one would think that he would want to say that freedom is the negation of all limits, including internal ones. In "The Concept of Essence" Marcuse writes that "man must be freed from real need and real misery to

achieve the liberation of becoming himself."⁷⁸ This citation suggests that the ultimate free existence of men involves a transcendence of real needs; the fulfillment of needs is not itself freedom, but is a necessary condition for realizing freedom. Yet in "The Ideology of Death" he suggests that our final internal limit--death--can only be mastered when treated as an external threat,⁷⁹ which suggests that Marcuse feels that men can never be free from internal necessity, but can be free only in overcoming external necessities in order to allow their internal necessity to unfold. It is my belief that Marcuse does in fact believe that men are necessitated to act in given ways, that he is wrong in believing so, that it is inconsistent with any notion of freedom, contradicts his own belief that freedom is only meaningful "as the coterminous of" necessity,⁸⁰ or that any limit is a negation of human potentials, that it is not necessary to his concept of freedom, and that it contradicts his own analysis in One Dimensional Man, in which the concepts of false needs and false consciousness make no sense unless men are free to make choices about their needs. Since this problem is linked with Eros and Civilization, and since it is one of the major problems I identified at the first of this chapter as needing separate development, we shall leave it for the next chapter for a fuller discussion.

There can be no doubt, however, that Marcuse links human freedom to the overcoming of external forces which limit the realization of an individual's potentials. These external limits include situations in which men are required to spend all their time in satisfying basic survival needs. This is the true realm of necessity--the work world. The needs to be satisfied are strictly physiological. The first step to

freedom, therefore, entails the reduction of the work week; that is, a reduction in the amount of time spent in satisfying basic human needs.⁸¹

This suggests that freedom can exist only beyond the realm of necessity.⁸²

But, it is Marcuse's hope that under modern conditions the work world can also become a liberating world. In other words, men, in the process of working to satisfy basic needs, would perform tasks which expressed their potentials as well.⁸³

Reason, which demanded the sacrifice of pleasure in order to satisfy basic needs and necessity in order to ensure survival, would, under conditions of abundance and in an age of self-regulating machines, finally become identical with freedom and happiness, for no longer would the realization of individual potentials have to be sacrificed.⁸⁴ But, it can be argued that if the "realm of necessity" is necessitated by the need to satisfy needs, and if men need to be free, then in what sense can Marcuse ever distinguish a realm of freedom from a realm of necessity? This usage of his distinguishing the two realms would seem to indicate that he either does not believe that men must necessarily be free, or that he has two uses of needs which he fails to distinguish for us.⁸⁵

The final relationship between freedom and necessity is the human triumph over "inexorable objective laws."⁸⁶ Freedom involves the mastering of objective laws--such as economic and natural laws--for use in human development, rather than allowing these laws to dominate and determine men. On this point Marcuse is very explicit that he does not regard men as being free if they are governed by "inexorable laws of society."⁸⁷ He rejects the idea that freedom is "recognized necessity", or that freedom is "insight into necessity."⁸⁸ Rather, freedom is

"'comprehended' necessity," which requires a transition of man to a "different dimension of 'being,'" rather than an extension, improvement, or elaboration of the present dimension.⁸⁹ To take an example; the contradictions of capitalism necessitate change, but state capitalism is a sufficient change. Yet state capitalism does not make anyone freer. Freedom is achieved when the contradictions of capitalism, the "laws" of capitalism, are transcended altogether and subjected to human developmental needs. The change is not "automatic but presupposes the action and consciousness of the revolutionary class."⁹⁰ In the first case of state capitalism, the contradictions of capitalism were merely resolved, but the needs of the economy still determined men's lives; in the second case, the basis of the contradiction is transformed. Only the latter case, where men consciously and freely restructure social and economic conditions, is an example of "comprehended" necessity. But to say that men have this choice to make is to say that men are not being need governed.

We find then that in this last aspect of the positive category of freedom there are considerable difficulties. Whether they can be resolved may in large part determine the answer to the question of just how secure the positive category is in Marcuse's concept of freedom.

9. Freedom as Self-Determination

If freedom involves choice, then it follows that freedom also involves self-determination. If a person chooses his own existence, then that person is determining his own self. Thus, freedom and self-determination are the same thing. Or are they? Can a person who is responding to needs be said to be self-determined? Probably he can, for it is

his "self" needs which determine his behaviour. Freedom, it seems, necessitates self-determination; but self-determination does not require freedom, unless one denies that freedom requires choice, but is instead solely identical with the realization of one's potentials. Certainly self-determination is essential to the development of one's potentials, for it is only through experiencing the determination of one's existence that one recognizes one's self as existing in the world. Self-determination is, in other words, the opposite of alienation, for as long as one does not govern one's own manner of existence, one's potentials are neither acknowledged, nor capable of being realized. "Freedom...means being not a mere object, but the subject of one's existence: not succumbing to external conditions, by transforming factuality into realization."⁹¹ Man, Marcuse writes, "has the potentiality of freely determining and shaping his own existence, directed by the process of knowledge and with regard to his worldly happiness."⁹² Men, to be free, must be the creators of their own existence. The alternative is that someone, or something, else is choosing for them. Even if Marcuse sees men as being need determined, yet he is clearly rejecting any idea of a policy of coerced freedom.⁹³

10. Freedom as the Negation of Limiting Structures

"Freedom is essentially negative.... Reason is the negation of the negative."⁹⁴ At times in Reason and Revolution Marcuse pretty clearly seems to be claiming that freedom consists, not in the fulfillment of any possibility, but rather in the constant negation of all limits on potential behaviour, including that which one has been. In other words, he seems to suggest that man, when free, never comes to know a state of

rest in perfect fulfillment of being, but must continue to negate his own present condition of being to become other than he is. If Marcuse does accept this view, then this means that any notion that there is some absolute or positive identity or self for man would be a limit on man's freedom. To say that men had such-and-such needs, being positive, would be a limit. "Essence," he writes:

has 'no determinate Being'.... The essence is...the negation of all being. This negation of all being is not nothing, but the 'infinite movement of Being' beyond every determinate state. The movement is not a contingent and external process but one held together by the process of self-relation through which a subject posits its determinates as moments of its own self-realization.⁹⁵

The essential character of "being for itself"--of conscious and purposeful being--is that it is the "negation of all determinates. Its essential character is therefore negativity."⁹⁶ Marcuse does not deny that every stage in development is in itself positive; but what he does deny is that the positive character of men can ever be "frozen" or essentialized. We can say what a man's possibilities are for tomorrow on the basis of the present determinate conditions,⁹⁷ but after that we cannot say what men could or should be. Men cannot be endowed with a positive essence. Yet this is what Marcuse does when he equates needs with freedom and potentials.

What is given, what exists, is in fact negative; it is "other than its real potentialities."⁹⁸ "The given facts...are in reality the negation of truth, so that truth can only be established by their destruction."⁹⁹ Any social fact, any social institution, any pattern of interaction, is a limit--a negation--in the sense that there are other possibilities for inter-action, other possible social structures, etc. One

type of social fact is class, and, as such, class acts as a limit on man's freedom. "Each is free to the extent that his class is free, and the development of his individuality is confined to the limits of his class."¹⁰⁰

All limiting structures must therefore be eliminated before man can be free, and all structures are by definition limiting. Therefore, any other state than that of anarchy amongst people is a state of unfreedom.

11. Freedom as Community

To say that men, to be free, must be able to master their environment in order to expand the realm of freedom, is to say that men must work together. Yet how can men work together without establishing limiting structures, such as classes? The only way is for each man to recognize the other's freedom, and then for the men to work co-operatively to maximize their own and each other's freedom. Decisions must not be dictated to the other, but rather consensually determined on the basis of every man's freedom requirements. Everyone's interests must be acknowledged, for otherwise someone will have to be coerced, which automatically limits everyone's freedom. The individual will must be compatible with the general interest, and the general interest is that everyone be as free as possible. This description of the community is reminiscent of the subject-object union, and the necessary universality of reason. It is therefore precisely Marcuse's own view as to the nature of the free community.

Marcuse writes that the

ultimate freedom of the individual will not contradict the ultimate freedom of the whole, but will be fulfilled only within and through the whole.... The community that conforms to reason's standard must be conceived 'not as a limitation on the individual's true freedom, but as an expansion of it.'¹⁰¹

Nor is the member of the community "made free" by following the will of the community, whatever it may be, for "the individual can hope to fulfill himself only if he is a free member of a real community."¹⁰² No man can be free unless he lives in a community, and unless all other men are free.

Man's very nature lies in his universality. His intellectual and physical faculties can be fulfilled only if all men exist as men, in the developed wealth of their human resources. Man is free only if all men are free and exist as 'universal beings'. When this condition is attained, life will be shaped by the potentialities of the genus, Man, which embraces the potentialities of all individuals that comprise it.¹⁰³

Marcuse even asserts that his contention "that true individual freedom can coexist with real general freedom and, indeed, is possible only in conjunction with it," is not a proposition of "philosophical anthropology about the nature of man," but a description of a "historical situation which humanity has achieved for itself in the struggle with nature."¹⁰⁴

In other words, in an era of abundance, Marcuse sees no need why all cannot be free.

If freedom is identified with the satisfaction of needs, then how can Marcuse criticize Plato's Republic? Yet Marcuse's notion of a community of free individuals does not sit well with a philosopher-king. For this reason, it would appear that Marcuse is primarily concerned with negative freedom--the freedom to transcend or negate--rather than positive freedom--the realization of one's essence, unless the essence is itself negative. This suggests again that Marcuse's belief that needs lie behind men's potentials is not a genuine part of his concept of freedom.

From this brief summary of Marcuse's concept of freedom two problems emerge above all others. The first relates to the question of needs, and

indeed to the whole positive side of Marcuse's concept of freedom. Can need satisfaction ever be identical with freedom in any sense? If so, what is the nature of a need such that it could be? Do the notions of needs and the universal potentials of men contradict Marcuse's negative notion of freedom? In this chapter I have suggested that the answers are no and yes respectively. But in the next chapter I shall re-examine the problem more thoroughly in the light of Eros and Civilization. The question of the relation of the positive to the negative aspects of freedom will be examined in the concluding chapter. The second problem involves the question of whether reason necessarily ends in freedom. To put it another way, is mind or consciousness a mere reflection of processes external to consciousness; or does consciousness constitute its own truth and then realize it through action? On the answer to this question hinges the acceptability of Marcuse's claim to identify reason and freedom, and to make freedom the central concept for understanding man's history, for if the mind is free, then it is free to reject freedom. Furthermore, to say that choice precedes freedom in setting freedom as one's goal, is to undermine the positive aspect of Marcuse's freedom as well, for freedom was identified with the realization of one's potentials largely on the basis of the fact that reason revealed the truth of one's being to be the realization of one's potentials. Reason dictated that men fulfill their being. But once reason is subordinated to choice, its claim to be the sole arbitor of truth is lost. We shall re-examine this question in Chapter III.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

¹Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 9.

²Herbert Marcuse, "On Hedonism," trans. J.J. Shapiro, in Negations (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 167.

³A favorite charge laid against Marcuse by his critics is that he is guilty of Orwellianisms. See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, Marcuse (Bungay: Fontana/Collins, 1970), p. 68; Marshall Cohen, "The Norman Vincent Peale of the Left," in The Atlantic, 223; 6 (June, 1969): p. 108; Sidney Hook, "Help Wanted--Superman: A Review of An Essay on Liberation," in The New York Times Book Review (April 20, 1964): pp. 8-12; Julius Gould, "The Dialectics of Despair," in Encounter, 23: 3 (Sept., 1964): p. 70.

⁴Marcuse, Reason, p. 19.

⁵Ibid., pp. 24-25.

⁶Marcuse, "On Hedonism," p. 198. See also Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in K. Wolff, B. Moore, Jr., and H. Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 86-90.

⁷Marcuse, Reason, p. 46.

⁸Ibid., p. 64.

⁹Herbert Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence," trans. J.J. Shapiro, in Negations, p. 67.

¹⁰Marcuse, Reason, pp. 24-25; Marcuse "Essence," p. 67.

¹¹Marcuse, Reason, p. 49.

¹²Ibid., p. 136.

¹³This argument is largely inspired by my interpretation of Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1958), pp. 437-459, 476-479; Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959); R.D. Laing, The Politics of the Family (Toronto: C.B.C. Publications, 1969); Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz (New York: The Noonday Press, 1955); Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966);

R.D. Laing and D.G. Cooper, Reason and Violence (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964); G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1967).

¹⁴ Marcuse, Reason, p. 68.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. x.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 19.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 19.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

²² Ibid., p. 255.

²³ Ibid., p. 231.

²⁴ MacIntyre, op.cit., p. 22.

²⁵ Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Random House Vintage, 1970), p. 169.

²⁶ Marcuse, Reason, p. 24.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 45.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 47.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 125.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 125.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 114-120.

³² Ibid., p. 275.

³³ Ibid., p. 351.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

³⁵ Herbert Marcuse, "The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State," trans. J.J. Shapiro, in Negations, pp. 3-42.

³⁶ Infra., p. 91.

³⁷ Herbert Marcuse, "Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber," trans. K. Wolff, and J.J. Shapiro, in Negations, pp. 201-226.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 215-216.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 221.

⁴⁰ MacIntyre, op.cit., p. 41.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 40.

⁴² Althusser, op.cit., p. 13.

⁴³ Marcuse, Negations, p. xvi

⁴⁴ Marcuse, Reason, p. 332.

⁴⁵ Herbert Marcuse, "Socialist Humanism?" in Socialist Humanism, ed. Erich Fromm (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1965), pp. 99-100.

⁴⁶ Marcuse, Reason, pp. 189-190.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 228.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 238.

⁴⁹ Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 49-57. Also Herbert Marcuse, "The Question of Revolution," in The New Left Review, 45 (Sept./Oct., 1967), p. 7; Herbert Marcuse, Five Lectures, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 70-71, 92-93; "'The Father of the Student Rebellion?'--Herbert Marcuse Talks to Robert MacKenzie," in The Listener 80 (17 Oct. 1968): p. 498.

⁵⁰ Herbert Marcuse, "Revolutionary Subject and Self-Government," in Praxis 5 (1969): pp. 328-329; Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (New York: Random House Vintage, 1962), p. viii.

⁵¹ Marcuse, Reason, p. 38.

⁵² Herbert Marcuse, "Love Mystified: A Critique of Norman O. Brown," in Negations, pp. 236-237.

⁵³ Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," trans. J.J. Shapiro, in Negations, p. 143.

⁵⁴ Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 121 ff.

⁵⁵ Marcuse accepts the lesser definition as well. See "The Affirmative Character of Culture," trans. J.J. Shapiro, in Negations, p. 101.

⁵⁶ Marcuse, Reason, p. 279.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 275.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 277.

⁵⁹ Richard Sennett, The Uses of Disorder (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1970).

⁶⁰ Marcuse, Reason, p. 277.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 279.

⁶² MacIntyre, op.cit., p. 37.

⁶³ Marcuse, "Hedonism," p. 161.

⁶⁴ Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 51.

⁶⁵ Marcuse, "Culture," p. 114.

⁶⁶ Marcuse, "Hedonism," p. 173.

⁶⁷ Herbert Marcuse, "Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'Etre et le Néant," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8;3 (March, 1948): p. 332.

⁶⁸ Marcuse, Reason, p. 293.

⁶⁹ MacIntyre, op.cit., p. 37.

⁷⁰ Marcuse, "Hedonism," p. 180.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 192.

⁷² Ibid., p. 191.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 189-190.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 191.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 180.

⁷⁶ Marcuse, "Existentialism," p. 322.

⁷⁷ See also on this point Albert Camus, "The Myth of Sisyphus," in The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Random House Vintage, 1955), p. 40.

⁷⁸ Marcuse, "Essence," p. 72.

⁷⁹ Herbert Marcuse, "The Ideology of Death," in The Meaning of Death, ed. Herman Feifel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), p. 64.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 66.

⁸¹ Herbert Marcuse, "Preface," in Raya Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom, 2nd ed. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1964), p. 18.

⁸² Herbert Marcuse, "The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity--A Reconsideration," in Praxis 5 (1969): p. 22.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 20-25.

⁸⁴ Marcuse, Eros, p. 204.

⁸⁵ In other words, he means by needs something other than our normal usage which suggests that needs must be satisfied in order to survive; or else, he uses the ordinary meaning in conjunction with another meaning whereby needs are self-determined. Just what he is doing with the definition of needs is left unspecified by Marcuse; which results in considerable confusion in at least this reader's mind.

⁸⁶ Marcuse, Reason, p. 332.

⁸⁷ Herbert Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws," in Partisan Review 26 (Winter 1959): p. 118.

⁸⁸ Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (New York: Random House Vintage, 1961), p. 136.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 136.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 136-137.

⁹¹ Marcuse, Reason, p. viii.

⁹² Marcuse, "Liberalism," p. 15.

⁹³ Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 6.

⁹⁴ Marcuse, Reason, pp. ix-x.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 142.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 141.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 64.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 26.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 275.

¹⁰⁴ Marcuse, "Hedonism," p. 192.

CHAPTER II

In this chapter we take up the problem of needs in Marcuse's concept of freedom in light of his work on Freud, Eros and Civilization.

We shall first follow the development of the concept of freedom as presented in the Freudian context by Marcuse, to see if it is a reasonable definition of freedom, and more importantly, to see if with its emphasis on needs and instincts it deviates from Marcuse's original concept of freedom. In this exposition we shall point out especially how Marcuse plays on an ambiguity in Freud's concept of Eros, which allows him to make of Eros both a need and a conscious principle of action, and consider whether Marcuse is correct in using his ambiguity. We shall then consider more specifically the problem of needs and freedom, after rejecting Marcuse's attempt to make of needs something other than they are. Finally we suggest a middle ground which is developed by Marcuse himself, which seems to get Marcuse out of his dilemma.

Marcuse's thesis as presented in Eros and Civilization is, in large part, a restatement of Freud's own Civilization and Its Discontents. Marcuse argues that society is involved in a destructive dialectic based on the internal human struggle between Eros (the life instinct) and Thanatos (the death instinct). Marcuse accepts Freud's argument that civilization or society is repressive, in that it requires men to deny themselves the satisfaction of their basic erotic instincts. He also accepts that all that limits man's aggressiveness (sublimated death instinct) is the binding power of Eros. Therefore, civilization requires both restrictions on the scope of Eros, and at the same time requires Eros to limit the equally socially destructive instinct of

death. However, "the perpetual restrictions on Eros ultimately weaken the life instincts and thus strengthen and release the very forces against which they were 'called up'--those of destruction."¹ Freud believed that this situation was part of the permanent condition of man in society. Marcuse makes his original contribution in arguing that in fact Eros can be unbound without any harm resulting to social organization as such, and therefore at the same time restrict the aggressiveness of the sublimated death instinct.

In a state of perfect freedom men would be able to satisfy all their instinctual impulses. The pleasure principle would become the human arbitor of individual activities. But, under conditions of scarcity, want, or need, men cannot freely gratify their every impulse, but instead must delay and repress their desires in order that they might satisfy their basic needs.² The id is the centre of the impulses, and it is governed by the pleasure principle. The conscious ego, under the guidance of the reality principle, suppresses the demands of the id in the interest of the survival of the organism. One difficulty, which comes up immediately here, is just where the ego is centred, for Eros, as Marcuse admits, is a blend of "instinct, principle, (and) regulation."³ Eros strives to maintain life, even if it serves only as a long "detour to death."⁴ How then can Eros be differentiated from the reality principle? And if Eros is itself an instinct, and if the pleasure principle is based on the gratification of the instincts, then how can satisfying Eros--the reality principle--ever contradict satisfying the pleasure principle? There are two possible answers to this problem; one

is that a given historical form of the reality principle is in fact not-real, such that the conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle originates in the falsity of the reality principle; the other is that Eros itself has Freud's earlier sexual-libido theory built into it, such that Eros has more content to it than just preserving life, and this additional content could come into contradiction with the reality principle. The latter solution would seem to be Freud's own solution, yet it seems to be somewhat illegitimate in that it involves a confusion of two theories. Eros on the one hand is a balance to the death instinct. As such, it is almost the reality principle, the conscious ego drive, internalized. It is not sublimated libido, but an instinct in itself. On the other hand, Eros is identified with the earlier id-sexuality-libido theory of human activity. So what one ends up saying is that Eros is sexual and id-originated, but yet it is not. The only way to get out of this impasse is to define sexuality as a life instinct as Marcuse does.⁵ But this would definitely be a reinterpretation of Freud. It is largely this issue which lies at the bottom of the dispute between Marcuse and Fromm, the latter taking Freud at his own word, and the former redefining the instincts altogether. Marcuse, nevertheless, argues both sides as to how the reality and pleasure principles might be incompatible. The two sides are linked, however, for only if Eros and sexuality mean more than survival can a given reality principle be criticized as being bad or false, in that it undermines life itself. What, then, does the satisfaction of the Eros instinct--freedom--involve according to Marcuse?

Marcuse writes that:

liberated from the pressure of painful purposes and performances necessitated by want, man will be restored into the 'freedom to be what he ought to be.' But what 'ought' to be will be freedom itself: the freedom to play.⁶

By playing Marcuse means the "play of life itself, beyond want and external compulsion."⁷ Play would not be as we think of it today--recreation and rest--rather it would be the full development of all man's repressed talents, abilities, and potentials. Nor would the release of the instincts lead to a wild abandon on the part of man, for libido would be transformed

from sexuality constrained under genital supremacy to eroticization of the entire personality.... This transformation of the libido would be the result of a societal transformation that released the free play of individual needs and faculties.⁸

Here, clearly, Marcuse has redefined libido, Eros, and even sexuality, for he argues that in playing through the entire person "the instinct is not 'deflected' from its aim; it is gratified in activities that are not sexual in the sense of 'organized' genital sexuality, and yet are libidinal and erotic."⁹ Marcuse argues that his notion of play is similar to Freud's own notion of "polymorphous perversity,"¹⁰ by which Freud meant to suggest that originally the whole body was eroticized. But it is worth noting that Marcuse does defer to the "sexual" aspect of Freud in speaking of his play as non-repressive sublimation.¹¹ If Eros is play in the larger sense of the play of life, then why would play be sublimation? Marcuse seems to be confused in his discussion of libidinal sexuality between the two theories of Eros--Eros as life instinct, and Eros as sexual instinct.

Another problem still to be confronted, however, is whether, given the Freudian framework, man can ever be free if he must repress any amount of instinctual energy in favour of delayed gratification via the work process. Marcuse, as we shall see, accepts the need for some "basic" repression which involves "the 'modifications' of the instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization."¹² Labour cannot be abolished, but only considerably reduced.¹³ But according to the Freudian analysis, as presented by Marcuse, any delayed gratification or repression of instinctual energies results in an ever enlargening dialectic which unleashes the anti-social forces of destruction. Energy denied to Eros can only strengthen Thanatos. Referring to this same problem, and the problem referred to above concerning non-repressive sublimation (or polymorphous perversity) Robinson points out that Marcuse's notion of non-repressive sublimation and "basic" repression fit

rather badly with the economic conception of psychic energy which he (Marcuse) had been prepared to accept in his analysis of the dialectic of civilization, and it is quite evident that Marcuse chose to adopt or discard the hydraulic metaphor as it suited the purposes of his argument.¹⁴

Marcuse tries to ease himself around this difficulty both by suggesting that a drastic reduction in the work week would have some sort of qualitative effect on repression,¹⁵ and secondly by suggesting that freedom or instinctual satisfaction could also be realised in work or labour itself.

If Ananke itself becomes the primary field of libidinal development...the struggle for existence...would even constitute a 'prop' for instinctual gratification. The work relations which form the basis of civilization, and

thus civilization itself, would be 'propped' by non-desexualized instinctual energy."¹⁶

In other words, insofar as work itself became free and pleasurable, men would do it, and additionally they could do it without repressing their instincts. However, this is a dream based on the eventual total mechanization of all routine work for:

work as free play cannot be subject to administration; only alienated labor can be organized and administered by rational routine. It is beyond this sphere, but on its basis, that non-repressive sublimation creates its own cultural order.¹⁷

But here again Marcuse appears to be confused, for in the previous quotation work is to be "propped" by "non-desexualized instinctual energy," whereas in the last quotation work is to be non-repressive desublimation.

Which of these two alternatives does Marcuse opt for? If he opts for sublimation, his problem remains unresolved, for sublimation of any sort is equivalent to repression. But work as sexually gratifying is almost absurd. Robinson suggests that Marcuse was on firmer ground in recommending a reduction in the work week, rather than venturing into the transformation of the work world itself.¹⁸ But even the reduction of the work week is not clearly going to put an end to the dialectic of civilization. Repression is repression.

Now we are ready to answer the question posed initially; namely, how can the reality and pleasure principles ever conflict inasmuch as both are attributes of the Eros instinct. The answer, briefly, is that the current reality principle is in fact a false or bad reality principle.

The reality principle is the principle of the life instincts, and of the conscious ego. It seeks only to sustain and preserve the human being and body in a hostile other world.¹⁹ As such, the reality principle

may deny the pleasure principle, but only because the pleasure principle, if allowed free reign, would unintentionally cause the destruction of the human being. The reality principle becomes false to the life instincts when it denies the pleasure principle under conditions which would allow for the latter's satisfaction. "Behind the reality principle lies the fundamental fact of Ananke or scarcity."²⁰ To the extent that man has overcome scarcity, the reality principle need be less repressive.

The repression which is no longer necessitated by the reality of scarcity Marcuse calls "surplus-repression." The false reality principle which presently governs men's behaviour he calls the "performance principle."²¹

Marcuse believes that given the present potential of industrial society, men could easily satisfy their basic survival needs with a minimum of repression. But he also points out that it is not in the interests of the dominant class to allow men to gratify all their needs; they must continue to deny themselves, to work at dull jobs, and lead boring existences, in order that profits and profitable enterprises might be maintained. The performance principle must be maintained as the reality principle, for if men were allowed to gratify themselves even partially, they would very quickly become discontented with, and change the system that perpetuated toil, which obviously would run counter to the interests of the present ruling class.²² As long as men do not taste freedom, they can be kept docile. But once they have enjoyed it, then the demand for it--the need for it--cannot be denied.

The performance principle...is that of an acquisitive and antagonistic society in the process of constant expansion.... Men do not live their own lives but perform pre-established functions. While they work, they do not fulfill their own needs and faculties, but work in alienation.²³

As civilization increases the reality of the possible realization of human potentials--the release of the Eros instinct--civilization must become more repressive than ever in order to maintain the performance principle, and the present structures of domination.²⁴ As a result, Eros is weakened even more, the death instinct runs free, and man and civilization totter on the brink of destruction. How can one call the performance principle the reality principle when its continued existence threatens the existence of man and society? The reality principle is reason in action; it must strive for human freedom whenever it is possible. The performance principle, with its emphasis on denial, sacrifice, toil, and an alienated existence, is not rational. Reason, the reality principle, happiness, and the pleasure principle are not innately antagonistic. Eventually they can and must be reconciled. Yet, within the Freudian context the notion of surplus repression and the possibility for a freer existence are unjustified. If even some repression is still needed, then men must be denied happiness generally, as Marcuse admits above when he claims that repression must increase as the possibility for a free existence becomes ever more possible. Also, as our earlier analysis indicated, the distinction between basic and surplus repression is unjustified, and even contradicts the analysis Marcuse uses to establish the destructive dialectic produced by the performance principle.

If freedom, as presented in Eros and Civilization, is to be equated with instinctual gratification and need satisfaction, does not this

suggest an inner determination of freedom, which is in fact a contradiction?²⁵ Here we must finally discuss the problem in understanding Marcuse's work of the relation between needs, potentials, instincts, and freedom.

Part of the problem in discussing this question is that Marcuse never quite adequately explains the difference between needs, potentials, and instincts. Freedom consists in the satisfaction of all three, but are all three the same? Are instincts and needs the same, or do needs arise from the inter-action of the instincts and the environment? Are needs and potentials the same, or are needs the ground--the precondition--for the realization of potentials? And even if they are all different, of what nature are they? Are instincts "physical-chemical" forces,²⁶ which men are born with and which entail that "happiness...is satisfaction of the sexual instincts, specifically of the wish for free access to all available females,"²⁷ or are they perhaps determined by an inter-action of spontaneously determined intents with given objective conditions, such that the satisfaction of the resulting "needs" will realize the potential which has been freely chosen?²⁸

Despite Marcuse's identification of freedom and necessity,²⁹ and freedom, needs, and instinctual satisfaction, it is the case that he never does give a "positive" content to necessity, other than to say that it is freedom; nor does he give any content to needs beyond the vital need satisfactions of food, shelter, and survival. He definitely rejects Freud's own notion of the identity of freedom and necessity in the free play of the genitally-organized sexual instincts.³⁰ This absence of any content suggests that perhaps Marcuse is using the terms

needs and instincts in a special way.

Marcuse argues that in Freudian theory the instincts, their needs, and their mode of satisfaction, are shaped by a "socio-historical world;"³¹ that "Freud's 'biologism' is a social theory in a depth dimension."³² In other words, we are not born with any positive needs, except perhaps for an instinct to live and the survival needs arising from that. Further, he suggests that instincts and principles have been assimilated in later Freudian theory, meaning not so much that the instincts determine our principles for action, as that the instincts are in fact principles; that is, the instincts become subject to rational determination and control, for "freedom is a form of domination,"³³ even if it is domination to the pleasure principle. But both these alternatives beg the question. In the first case society determines man's needs, rather than nature or his own self, which still leaves us with the same problem of reconciling freedom and determinism. In the second case, the pleasure principle is equivalent to need satisfaction; men may choose to satisfy their needs, but once having done so, are they still not need determined, albeit through the mediation of the pleasure principle?

There are many hints in Eros and Civilization that, in fact, needs, potentials, and instincts can be freely chosen. On one occasion Marcuse suggests that contemporary civilization is "shrinking...the conscious ego in a significant direction: the autonomous development of the instincts is frozen, and their pattern is fixed at the childhood level."³⁴ In other words, Marcuse envisions the instincts as being autonomously developed; or does he perhaps see them as developing autonomously--that is, according to their own inner logic? At another point he refers to

"needs beyond the realm of necessity,"³⁵ but he does not explain just what the origin of these needs are. However, he does state that with a reduction in "necessary" work, men can "both work less and determine their own needs and satisfactions."³⁶ This does suggest that needs in some way are to be freely chosen, and are not binding on or necessary for men. Finally, he suggests that instinctual pleasure can be heightened through the self-determination of the instincts, which consists in the establishing of barriers to instinctual gratification "for intensifying fulfillment."³⁷ He suggests that "only the instinct that has been restrained and mastered raises the merely natural satisfaction of need to pleasure that is experienced and comprehended--to happiness."³⁸ It is as if the amount of pleasure is equivalent to the quantity of instinctual discharge effected, and as a restraint on the instincts causes the energy to accumulate, a greater pleasure is achieved when one finally does release the instinct. But to say that men can restrain their needs is still not an unequivocal statement that men determine their own needs.

Marcuse clearly appears to be confused about the nature of needs and instincts. This is probably partly a result of his lack of consistency in explicating Freud's theory of the instincts. It is possible that Eros in its larger sense of the life instinct is subject to conscious determinations, such that needs are not necessary or binding. Yet much of Marcuse's critique of civilization is based on the repression inherent in civilization. Repression only makes sense in terms of Eros considered as specific needs and instincts which men are endowed with. Eros in the larger sense can never be repressed; it can be diverted into less satisfying channels of fulfillment, but it cannot be

said to be repressed. Furthermore, the dialectic of civilization itself is based on a physical-chemical model of human action, which also suggests naturally determined rather than consciously determined needs. Thus, in order to criticize society Marcuse finds it necessary to make needs non-consciously determined; but in order to reconcile needs and freedom, he must make needs subject to some conscious influence. But he cannot have it both ways.

If Marcuse appears to be confused about the nature of needs--and necessarily so, given the Freudian framework--his critic Erich Fromm appears to provide an answer to the problem. Fromm argues that any conception of human nature must start with the "fact of the 'human situation!',³⁹" which consists of "the specific conditions of human existence."⁴⁰

Man, having awareness of himself, has transcended the natural world; he is life aware of itself. At the same time he remains a part of nature, and from this contradiction follow his basic passions and strivings; the need to relate himself to others, the need to transcend his own role as a creature by creating (or destroying), the need to have a sense of identity, and a frame of orientation or devotion. These needs can be fulfilled in various ways--the difference between them is the difference between mental health and illness, between happiness and unhappiness. Yet they must be fulfilled unless man is to become insane. ... This concept of human existence is not less real than that of the instincts, and it is not idealistic; it is broader and conceived in terms of activity and practice--rather than of a specific psychological substance.⁴⁰

Human needs must be understood in "terms of activity and practice," not in terms of instincts and forces. Needs arise out of man's transcendent and intentional existence in a natural world. Needs are part of a structure, one pole of which is a freely choosing man. Happiness then consists not in the satisfaction of needs so much, as in the achievement

of the intention. This seems to be the only possible way of considering needs--as part of a dialectic between subject and object--which preserves the idea of self-determination and freedom.

Marcuse comes close to presenting a "dialectic of needs" in his discussion of the aesthetic in Eros and Civilization. Drawing on Kant and Schiller, Marcuse argues that the "aesthetic dimension is the medium in which the senses and intellect meet."⁴¹ Although the aesthetic relates to the senses, and is therefore receptive rather than productive, nevertheless, "the aesthetic imagination is creative: in a free synthesis of its own, it constitutes beauty. In the aesthetic imagination sensuousness generates universally valid principles for an objective order."⁴² The aesthetic judgement is a "third" faculty of the mind; it effects a unity between man as free creator-subject, and man as object-sufferer through the senses.⁴³ The body, its needs and its instincts, are not ignored, but rather, through the aesthetic judgement, the "lower and higher" faculties of man are reconciled.⁴⁴ In a spontaneous act men constitute their definition of beauty, both pleasing to a man's biological self, and his transcendent, free, and spontaneous self. Man constitutes beauty, which in turn is a mere reflection of man's sensual self, of his life instincts, and of his needs. Beauty, play and imagination synthesize subject and object, free man from his present self, and permit him to transcend the here-and-now world to a world richer in enjoyment and satisfaction of human potentials. It is this free act of constituting the beautiful which unites freedom with necessity.

But what, if anything, has happened to Marcuse's concept of freedom as presented in the earlier chapter. It is perhaps in the "Philosophic Interlude" contained in Eros and Civilization, that we see the

change most clearly reflected. In that chapter Marcuse writes that, "the true mode of freedom is, not the incessant activity of conquest, but its coming to rest in transparent knowledge and gratification of being."⁴⁵ In other words, men are to enjoy themselves as both objects and actors. No longer will men deny themselves for a future good, but rather they will satisfy themselves now. No longer is man to be seen as being in a state of "becoming", but rather he is accepted as "being."⁴⁶ The "traditional ontology" which emphasized Logos as a Logos of becoming, achievement, domination, and denial is replaced by a "conception of being in a-logical terms: will and joy. This counter-trend seeks to formulate its own Logos: the logic of gratification."⁴⁷

Existence would be experienced not as continually expanding and unfulfilled becoming, but as existence or being with what is and can be. Time would not seem linear, as a perpetual line, or a rising curve, but cyclical, as the return contained in Nietzsche's idea of the 'perpetuity of pleasure.'⁴⁸

But this vision of freedom seems to run counter to Marcuse's concept of freedom which he presented in Reason and Revolution, where transcendence, negation and becoming seemed to be of the essence to freedom. Is Marcuse just being carried away with his language; is he perhaps saying nothing more than that men must make themselves the content of their own lives, and strive only to achieve the "free self-externalization, release and 'enjoyment' of potentialities?"⁴⁹ Or does he really mean that men come to a stop in their progress when they finally realize something that is their essential selves, as if they could do that? He describes the eternal return as representing a "dynamic rather than static unity" of "subject and object, of the universal and the individual."⁵⁰ On the other hand, he suggests that the "order of gratification which the free

Eros creates," is such that, "static triumphs over dynamic; but it is the static that moves in its own fullness--a productivity that is sensuousness."⁵¹ Just what Marcuse is trying to say here is a little difficult to fathom. It does seem to be the case, however, that he has changed his concept of freedom to emphasize being over becoming, and the positive over the negative.

One further idea concerning freedom that Marcuse presents in the "Philosophic Interlude" is that man would be able to redeem his past. He would be able to redeem it through forgiveness and reconciliation.⁵² Men are no longer trapped by events of a year ago, or two centuries ago. But as long as "the power of time over life" remains, "there can be no freedom: the fact that time does not 'recur' sustains the wound of bad conscience."⁵³

Eros and Civilization is principally an interpretive and visionary work, rather than being social science or philosophy. It conveys a feeling for freedom rather more than it offers a philosophically or even empirically justifiable definition or concept of freedom. Eros and Civilization is a transitional work; from the philosophy of Reason and Revolution Marcuse seems to be passing through a theory stage, which contains hints of his future "empirical" or sociological work contained in One Dimensional Man. The theory of man in Eros and Civilization is, I have tried to show, somewhat inconsistent with the freedom concept Marcuse develops in Reason and Revolution, owing chiefly to Marcuse's emphasis on needs and instincts, which have a positive, non-dialectic tone to them. For this reason I feel that most of the theoretical aspects of the work are best ignored. However, the more sociological

aspects of Eros and Civilization deserve much more attention as they are the first "scientific" applications of Marcuse's concept of freedom. The concepts of surplus repression, repressive desublimation, the performance principle, and his discussion of "ego-shrinkage," all relate to the ways in which social structures limit men's freedom. The concepts are all philosophically loaded; they are used to describe social practices and institutions from the viewpoint of Marcuse's freedom concept, so that they are revealing of the repressive, limiting, and negative aspects of the social structure. Since most of these concepts reappear in One Dimensional Man where he develops his critique of society in light of his freedom concept even more thoroughly, we shall return to these concepts in Chapter IV when we examine that aspect of Marcuse's work more thoroughly.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

¹Marcuse, Eros, p. 40.

²Ibid., p. 16.

³Ibid., p. 25.

⁴Ibid., p. 25.

⁵Ibid., p. 204.

⁶Ibid., p. 172.

⁷Ibid., p. 171.

⁸Ibid., p. 184. It is interesting to note here that Roderick Hindery feels that Marcuse in this concept of eroticization provides us with a genuine action-contemplation synthesis. In the past the contemplative man has often been authoritarian and withdrawn, while the activist has been just that--active to keep busy. Marcuse synthesizes the two. This is in "Marcuse's Eroticized Man," in Christian Century 88;5 (Feb. 4, 1970): p. 138. Others have accused Marcuse of being a Christian in disguise. See John Sparrow, "Marcuse: The Gospel of Hate," in The National Review 21;41 (Oct. 21, 1969): p. 1069; Edward Stillman, "Marcuse," in Horizon 11;3 (Summer, 1969): p. 31. Of course, others, such as MacIntyre, op.cit., accuse him of being too erotic-orientated, too interested in happiness, and not nearly concerned enough with the Protestant work ethic. All except Hindery are probably guilty of giving Marcuse a one-sided reading, emphasizing only that side which they want to criticize, and thus failing to see how Marcuse has synthesized mind and body; spirit and action.

⁹Marcuse, Eros, p. 190.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 44; pp. 190-191.

¹¹Ibid., p. 190.

¹²Ibid., p. 32. Also, Marcuse, Five Lectures, p. 81.

¹³Marcuse, Eros, p. 140.

¹⁴Paul A. Robinson, The Freudian Left (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 219-220.

¹⁵ Marcuse, Eros, p. 138.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 195.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 199.

¹⁸ Robinson, op.cit., p. 220.

¹⁹ Marcuse, Eros, p. 31.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 32.

²¹ Ibid., p. 32.

²² Ibid., pp. 43-44. See also Marcuse, "Hedonism," pp. 43-44; p. 184; p. 189.

²³ Marcuse, Eros, p. 41.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 41-42.

²⁵ Peter Clecak on this point comments, "The sort of liberation which Marcuse imagines would bind individuals to a new dimension of unfreedom, enslaving them to their libidinal desires, and to a depressingly cheerful mode of existence." Peter Clecak, "Marcuse: Ferment of Hope," in The Nation 288 (16 June 1969): p. 767.

²⁶ Erich Fromm, "The Human Implications of Instinctivist 'Radicalism,'" in Voices of Dissent (New York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 315.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 313.

²⁸ Marcuse, Eros, pp. 189-190.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 207-211. See also Herbert Marcuse "A Reply to Erich Fromm," in Dissent 3:1 (Winter, 1956): p. 79.

³¹ Marcuse, Eros, p. 12.

³² Ibid., p. 5.

³³ Herbert Marcuse, "Freedom and Freud's Theory of Instincts," in Five Lectures, p. 2.

³⁴ Marcuse, Eros., p. 30.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 85.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 91.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 208.

³⁸ Marcuse, Five Lectures, p. 6.

³⁹ Fromm, op.cit., p. 315.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 315.

⁴¹ Marcuse, Eros, p. 163.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 161-162.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 159.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 157.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 104.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 110.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 113.

⁴⁸ Marcuse, Five Lectures, p. 41.

⁴⁹ Marcuse, Eros, p. 106.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 105-106.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 149.

⁵² Ibid., p. 104.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 109.

CHAPTER III

Marcuse's double enterprise of trying to identify freedom and need satisfaction--the positive aspect of his freedom concept--and to prove that men need to be free, and therefore must be free, seems to be a failure. As we noted in Chapter I much of the positive aspect of freedom was very inadequately defined by Marcuse, and the attempt to resolve those inadequacies led him into the further difficulties encountered in the previous chapter. We are left, therefore, with his more negative conception of freedom, which is freedom as the self-determined transcendence of what is now. But here again we encounter a problem. What is the nature of the transcending consciousness such that it can be considered free; and how can Marcuse justify the centrality of his concept of freedom given this consciousness?

The problem of consciousness is most thoroughly discussed by Marcuse first in his analysis of Hegel's concept of "notion", for "the subject is notion.... 'The Notion, in so far as it had advanced into such an existence as is free in itself, is just the Ego, or pure self-consciousness.'"¹ The notion is not only a content, it is a process of comprehending reality. "The highest concepts of thought are treated as creative acts of the ego that are ever renewed in the process of knowledge."² The importance of emphasizing the notion as process lies in the fact that it indicates that knowledge is not merely a reflection of what is, but a creative and constitutive act of comprehension and transcendence.

The world of facts is not rational, but has to be brought to reason; that is, to a form in which the reality actually corresponds to the truth. As long as this has not been accomplished, the truth rests with the abstract notion and not the concrete reality.³

The mind rearranges facts, which are the second pole of the notion; the consciousness does not work with its own matter, but with the matter of the world. Consciousness is the seat, if you will, of synthesis, even of the dialectic; without consciousness, there would be no dialectic, for there would be no comprehending entity to establish truth or reality; but neither could there be a consciousness, if there were no facts, no world. Consciousness is not pure, but it is constitutive, and free in its constitutiveness. However, there still remains the problem of considering whether the consciousness is compelled to constitute a given notion on the basis of the objective conditions of the situation upon which it is reflecting. Is Capital the only notion that comprehends capitalism; is socialism the only possibility for transcendence? Marcuse explains that

The dialectic method derives all concrete determinations from one comprehensive principle, which is the principle of the actual development of the subject matter itself.... Dialectical development is not 'the external activity of subjective thought,' but the objective history of the real itself. Hegel is consequently able to say that in dialectical philosophy it is 'not we who frame the notions,' but that their formation is rather an objective development that we only reproduce.⁴

This passage seems to suggest that, although the mind appears to be constitutive, in fact it is not, since it only traces the development of a dynamic reality in the first place. But while this is the position of Hegel, it is hard to say if Marcuse accepts it as well. There do appear to be three faults in the idea though. One is that the need for

human action to bring reason to the world (or bring the world to reason) makes no sense if the world is evolving on its own. If men are the historical agents of reason, it also means that they must constitute what is reason as well. The world evolves only through men, and therefore in relation to men. Secondly, it is only because men have free consciousness that the dialectic is possible. As explained earlier, the dialectic transcendence of reality involves a rupture with the past; whereas a positivist transcendence is only an evolution of existing circumstances. Capitalism evolves into welfare capitalism, and not socialism, unless men intervene, as in the Soviet Union. It is only men who can effect ruptures with the past, for the rest of the world is evolutionary, and not revolutionary. Therefore, the facts themselves can never suggest a rupture, which "takes up" all previous contradictions to eliminate them in a higher synthesis. Only a freely creating consciousness can do this. Thirdly, I cannot comprehend myself because the "I" that comprehends me is incomprehensible while I am comprehending. Similarly, if my mind is determined by the world as a part of the world, then I can never comprehend the world since I am a part of it. Only if I stand outside the forces of history can I comprehend their resolution. But to say that I am outside is to say that my consciousness is undetermined.

In Reason and Revolution Marcuse never seems to either acknowledge the existence of a problem concerning consciousness, much less come to terms with it. However, in his discussion of the aesthetic judgement in Eros and Civilization, he does try to explain how mind is both free and determined. Through the third faculty of the mind, he suggests,

men constitute their own definition of truth and beauty. It is a spontaneous synthesis of mind and matter, freedom and determinateness, subject and object. Beauty is not determined gratuitously by us, but neither is it determined for us.

It is in his later works, One Dimensional Man and An Essay on Liberation, that Marcuse tackles the problem head on in a serious manner. In the first book he establishes once and for all, as we shall see, the autonomy of mind, so much so that he even appears to abandon the dialectic. In the second book he then justifies the centrality of his concept of freedom in the only way left to him after exhausting the possibilities of psychology, ontology, and metaphysics. He turns to history and society.

If Reason and Revolution was a work in philosophy, and Eros and Civilization was a work in psychological theory, then One Dimensional Man is a work in sociology, for in this last work Marcuse is not primarily concerned with presenting a theory of freedom, or a concept of man, but rather he attempts to demonstrate how society as a whole limits the freedom of men. The emphasis is on society, not on man or theory. It may seem odd that a Marxist should engage in sociology rather than economics; odder still that he should almost ignore economics altogether. Yet suddenly in One Dimensional Man the repressiveness of the western societies is not to be explained in terms of the capitalist economic system, or even exploitation, for the Soviet Union has its similar share of repression as well-- in fact, more. Rather, it is the "project" that is at fault. The use of project made by Marcuse is to suggest that history involves "determinate choice(s)."⁵ Marcuse wants "to emphasize

the ingressions of liberty into historical necessity; the phrase does no more than condense the proposition that men make their own history, but make it under given conditions.⁶ Societies are not formed then in accordance with economic necessities alone.

The way in which a society organizes life of its members involves an initial choice between historical alternatives which are determined by the inherited level of the material and intellectual culture. The choice itself results from the play of the dominant interests.⁷

Marcuse's position begins to resemble that of such value analysts as Parsons and Lipset, in that society is viewed as being integrated about dominant values, insofar as the bind of necessity will permit. Marcuse seems to be abandoning a dialectical materialist approach in favour of a voluntarist approach for explaining history and society. His only bow to dialectical materialism here involves his claim that the dominant interests in society determine the project. The current project is the "experience, transformation, and organization of nature as the mere stuff of domination."⁸ It is an attempt to dominate man and nature, pure and simple. Even exploitation recedes into the background of this project. Marcuse's retreat from economics can largely be accounted for by the fact that he believes that the fundamental contradiction in technological society is no longer so much economic, as much as one might say it is socio-psychological.

The thesis of One Dimensional Man is that,

technological progress, extended to a whole system of domination and co-ordination, creates forms of life (and of power) which appear to reconcile the forces opposing the system and to defeat or refute all protest in the name of the historical prospects of freedom from toil and domination.⁹

In other words, technology has created such abundance, and made work so

much less physically taxing, that the contradictions of capitalism, if not resolved, at least no longer have active, living agents.¹⁰ The capitalist economy has achieved its own brand of a static dynamism.

The thesis of One Dimensional Man calls Marcuse's whole dialectic approach considerably into question. A dialectical critique of a society is supposed to be based on real tendencies in that society.

The 'possibilities' must be within the reach of the respective society. They must be definable goals of practice. By the same token, the abstraction from the established institutions must be expressive of an actual tendency--that is, their transformation must be the real need of an underlying population.¹¹

The whole thesis of One Dimensional Man, however, is that society has managed to eliminate the need for change; in fact, it has even managed to make people unconscious of their own unfreedom. Then, one must ask, by what right does Marcuse criticize industrial society? More to the point, by what right does he justify the pre-eminence in history of his particular concept of freedom, since dialectical concepts should be abstracted from real tendencies in society? There are two possible answers; one is that there are progressive elements in society who do feel repressed; the other is that Marcuse has abandoned his dialectic position in favour of an idealist one in which a society is to be criticized according to his personal vision of the ideal society.

In One Dimensional Man, at least, Marcuse seems to have abandoned the dialectic.¹² In Reason and Revolution, Marcuse has argued for the primacy of freedom in history chiefly because any situation short of realizing universal freedom would experience contradictions which could only be resolved through greater freedom for all. Only the triumph of

universal freedom would end the march of reason and freedom through history.

In Eros and Civilization, on the other hand, Marcuse tried to argue that men need to be free. It is a subtle change, perhaps, but nevertheless it is not a dialectical position, but a positivist one.¹³ By the time one gets to One Dimensional Man Marcuse has even abandoned--fortunately--the belief that men feel a need to be free, and has replaced it with a more idealistic position; namely that men ought to be free in accordance with his idea of freedom. It is interesting to note that in One Dimensional Man Marcuse gives criteria for the evaluation of projects--and thus concepts, in so far as concepts exist in relation to projects--with one of the criteria being that the project must be in the interests of freedom, as if there was a choice.¹⁴ It is as if Marcuse accepts the fact that history can be made non-dialectically; that history is a process of "determinate choices," and that our choices should be made in accordance with his--Marcuse's-- true values. But once one accepts that history is made through freely made choices, which can be radically different one from the other, has not one abandoned the historical basis for establishing the truth of one's values?

Marcuse tries to rescue himself from this impasse in part by making a distinction between true and false consciousness. The former would "synthesize the data of experience in concepts which reflect, as fully and adequately as possible, the given society in the given facts."¹⁵ The true consciousness would find the society to be inherently repressive; the false consciousness would not. But on the question of false consciousness Marcuse is ambiguous. In discussing the cultural and social integration of workers and managers, he rejects the possibility that this integration is solely a change in consciousness--a simple manipulation

of the consciousness which leaves reality untouched.

Is such a fundamental change in consciousness understandable without assuming a corresponding change in the 'societal existence?' Granted even a high degree of ideological independence, the links which tie this change to the transformation of the productive process militate against such an interpretation.¹⁶

In other words, a false consciousness is nevertheless a reflection of the society in which one lives. Therefore, by talking of false consciousness Marcuse just moves the problem one step back; what is a true and what is a false harmonization of society? Where do the criteria for evaluation come from? Even to admit that there is more than one possible alternative solution for any contradiction is to undermine the basis of the truth of Marcuse's concept of freedom as a historical totalization. But at least Marcuse has finally committed himself on the mind-body problem.

The mind is more or other than conscious acts and behavior. Its reality might tentatively be described as the manner or mode in which these particular acts are synthesized, integrated by an individual.¹⁷

The mind is not a mere reflection of the physical world, and the physical experience; it is a comprehension. Nor is the comprehension entirely determinate in its negation and transcendence of the physical situation. Rather, the mind can constitute a concept from among several equally determinate choices. The choices are limited by the possibilities offered by the current state of development of a society, but nevertheless the mind is free to choose. But evidently men can choose to be unfree. So, while Marcuse has liberated consciousness from a strict determinism, yet he has made the defense of his concept of freedom difficult.

It has been suggested that in One Dimensional Man Marcuse abandoned his own dialectical Critical Theory, which focuses on the contradictions

in a social structure, in favour of pure description.¹⁸ Marcuse chose to emphasize how society was integrated, rather than focusing on how the society was unintegrated. He only briefly refers to the Third World and the American Negro in One Dimensional Man as being outside the society and thus likely agents or catalysts of revolution.¹⁹ Yet, as Jerry Cohen points out, this is where he should have begun his analysis, for these people are the living embodiment of the yet exploitative nature of capitalism, and the living manifestations of the contradictions in the economic system. Marcuse can be faulted for failing to recognize the precariousness of capitalism and for failing to notice the growing disenchantment of students with the academic disciplines. The book could probably have benefitted from some more profound analysis of the capitalist economic system and the ills accompanying it. Marcuse never in One Dimensional Man discusses alienation, anomie, or loss of community, except to say that alienation has been abolished in a false way. Yet these are some of the illnesses of modern technological society which can account for the present active protest against it. Marcuse, in ignoring the more explosive symptoms, missed his chance to foresee, and guide, the struggle against technological domination. These are the things he should have been emphasizing in One Dimensional Man. Instead, Marcuse has accepted the text-book view of modern society too completely. Thus, One Dimensional Man must be seen as a descriptive work rather than a critical work, for it failed to point beyond the status quo.

I suggested that in One Dimensional Man Marcuse abandoned the material dialectic in favour of an idealism involving a voluntaristic

interpretation of history. Freedom is no longer the end of history; rather men have to choose to be free. Men must first know what freedom is, conceptually and ideally, before they can make the correct choices.²⁰ Yet, to be fair, Marcuse's idealism is always determinate; his ideas of man or freedom are not dreams, but are comprehensions of man in his present social order in light of the possible freedom of men. In a sense, then, Marcuse has simply chosen to re-emphasize theory over practice, which gives his work a highly idealistic colouring. At a time when revolution is impractical, the promise of it can only be preserved in what seems to be dream-like, idealistic philosophy.²¹ Marcuse has always emphasized the role of ideas in progress, of values as well as needs, but as the times change, so does one's emphasis. Reason and Revolution was written in light of the Nazi success in Europe, when it seemed as if capitalism had reached its destructive limit, so that freedom and a new social order seemed to be the inevitable outcome, and practice and analysis, not utopian visions, were needed to realize it. But One Dimension Man was written in a time and place where bountiful harmony seemed to be the characteristic of the society. Thus, values and ideals become more important, because no one feels a vital need for change.²² Thus, in his introduction to Negations, Marcuse suggests that the failure of socialism in Germany was because the critics of capitalism had not been radical, utopian, and idealistic enough to preach for a new, free social order.²³ Advanced industrial society has to be fought initially at the level of ideology, and this explains Marcuse's fight to redefine for modern man just what freedom is.²⁴ To accuse Marcuse of abandoning the dialectic is thus false.

But he is still unable to defend his freedom concept.

What if in fact there does exist a group of people who do feel oppressed, who desire to be free so that they can choose to choose, or to be free? Then the dialectic truth of Marcuse's emphasis on freedom would be preserved, especially if these people were to be successful in their intent, for in choosing to be free, they would make freedom the end of history. It would seem that at just about the same time that Marcuse wrote One Dimension Man, forces erupted within American society which would rescue him from his own idealism. Marcuse fell for the myth of the Welfare State--that it was solving all the ills of man. In fact, the ills of man were just temporarily being pasted over.

In an early work, "The Affirmative Character of Culture," Marcuse seemed to take a Platonic view of man; man was mind, body and soul. Mind was the seat of pure thought and reason; the body obviously was the living organism; and the soul was "an unmastered intermediate realm between the unshakeable self-certainty of pure thought and the mathematical and physical certainty of material being."²⁵ The soul was composed of the "individual's feelings, appetites, desires, and instincts."²⁶ The soul in fact constituted the individuality of man.²⁷ The soul, as neither mind nor body, was an embarrassment to science and philosophy, which could not deal with it.²⁸ As such, it was left alone; it was unmanipulated; it was free.²⁹ The soul demanded expression, but in the capitalist period it could find expression only in the "higher" things in life. The soul, it was believed, could be free of the body;³⁰ therefore, the soul became completely spiritualized.³¹ But even in this state the soul does have its truth; it became spiritualized only because

it could not realize itself in the body in a world of want and scarcity. Nevertheless, even in its spiritual form the soul preserved the real needs and potentials of man.

But the soul really is essential--as the unexpressed, unfulfilled life of the individual. The culture of souls absorbed in a false form those forces and wants which could find no place in everyday life. The cultural ideal assimilated men's longing for a higher life: for humanity, goodness, joy, truth, and solidarity.³²

The soul, even when imperfectly satisfied by art and religion, is dangerous. The soul feels its lack of freedom, feels the need to be free, to become a man, to love and to enjoy life. It feels oppression and seeks release. In the article, Marcuse was primarily concerned to demonstrate how the soul is falsely satisfied through art. But in One Dimensional Man Marcuse's point is that the soul is no longer independent, but just as the concepts of the soul have been operationalized, so have the desires and feelings of the soul been manipulated.³³ The soul of bourgeois man is dying or is dead; that is a very commonplace observation. But the attack on the soul has been the inspiration for a new revolt. Literally, those with soul are fighting back, and the fight to save one's soul is a fight, and can only be a fight, against the entire social system.

Marcuse believes that in the revolutions in Viet Nam, Cuba, and China; in the activity in the negro ghettos in the United States; in the student confrontations in France and elsewhere; and in the life styles of the young, we are witnessing the "emergence of different goals and values," which will lead to a break in the repressive identity of social and individual needs and values in order to liberate men for living.³⁴ These events are

facts which are not only the symbols but also the embodiment of hope. They confront the critical theory of society with the task of re-examining the prospects for the emergence of a socialist society, qualitatively different from existing societies.³⁵

Marcuse chooses to put so much faith in the young simply because they are literally fighting for their lives. A pampered generation has suddenly been confronted with the reality that pampered them; and it wants to die in a foreign land. In fighting for their lives, they must fight a system which oppresses others both at home and abroad. The fight of the young is a genuine fight for peace and pacification. It is a real struggle.

The chances of the young, the blacks, and the third world for effecting a new American revolution are slight. By themselves, they cannot change American society; they must unite with the basic group in the society--the working class--in order to effect change. But the working class, Marcuse believes, will remain co-opted as long as prosperity continues. In fact, the young and the blacks court a fascist reaction from their society if they try to change the social system before the other groups are ready for the change.³⁶ But two features of modern capitalism which Marcuse notes make it possible that the young could eventually be successful. One is the change in the composition of the working class; the other is the coming crisis in capitalism.

In the technological age, brain becomes more important than brawn. Thus, a new working class emerges, which is well-educated, middle class, and indispensable to the system. The very same youths who are rebelling today on the campuses are this new working class of tomorrow. "This

'new working class,' by virtue of its position, could disrupt, re-organize, and redirect the mode and relationships of production."³⁷

As students, they are marginal; but as technicians they will be crucial. If they can avoid co-optation, they would be in a position to effect a revolution. But the "if", although real, is slight.

But the crisis of capitalism is real and is upon us. The rebellion in the Third World hurts capitalism in two ways. For one thing it costs money--lots of it--to fight these wars. Taxes increase and social services suffer. As taxes rise, the rate of profit after taxes falls. A system based on the profit motive will not last long if the rate of profit is falling. In order to counteract the normal problem of falling rates of profit, and in order to sell goods, technology develops through leaps and bounds (the DC-8 can only be made obsolete before wearing out by a supersonic jet, and thus the aero-space industry, in order to maintain its profits, must make the DC-8 prematurely obsolete in order to sell its wares), which in turn causes unemployment. The cost of unemployment relief, coupled with the lost market it represents, further cuts into the profit rate through the combination of higher taxes, and lower total revenues. At the same time, part of the market continues to expand if at a rate less than possible due to unemployment, and the demand for consumer goods continues to mount. The people must be satisfied; but this demand for consumption, coupled with the war and with the increasingly less profitable nature of business, results in a demand-full inflation. Furthermore, the foreign market is lost; these cheap sources of raw material are lost. The balance of payments is thrown out, which means that the country is losing money, and that even lower

rates of profit, and more unemployment are inevitable.³⁸ And finally, the capitalist system, in making life comfortable, is generating lethargy--a loss of "moral fibre"--among its people. People will simply not be slaves to their work when they can lead a comfortable existence. Thus, efficiency is reduced. All these things point to a major breakdown in capitalism as unemployment increases, the rate of profit falls, and inflation, incredibly enough, persists. If youth can make a link with the working class on the basis of this crisis, then a revolution is possible.

The question is, however, whether those people who embody the hope of mankind really do have a new sensibility? Marcuse expressly rejects the drop-outs as agents of change.³⁹ This leaves us with the activists, and who are they? Many of today's activists are frightening in their rigidity. The others seem to be more inclined to play at protest for a while, and then disappear.⁴⁰ Marcuse needs in order to make his concept of freedom a historical possibility a group of men and women who are like Camus' Rebel; who rebel for others, as well as themselves; who value human life, whosoever it might be; and who are unwilling to dictate the future for anyone, but treat everyone as free and equal beings. Does that man exist among the young?

But the essential point is that Marcuse rests his defense for the pre-eminence of freedom on his reading of real historical tendencies, needs, and projects in contemporary western society. No metaphysical philosophy of history; no theory of human nature, is used to justify his claim. It is based on the passion of a rebelling class. As such, his concept of freedom is defended as only it can be.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

¹Marcuse, Reason, p. 155.

²Ibid., p. 156.

³Ibid., pp. 156-157.

⁴Ibid., p. 158.

⁵Marcuse, Man, p. 221.

⁶Ibid., p. 221.

⁷Ibid., p. xvi.

⁸Ibid., p. xvi.

⁹Ibid., p. xii.

¹⁰Ibid., p. xiii.

¹¹Ibid., p. xi.

¹²See André Gorz, "Call for Intellectual Subversion," in The Nation, 198:22 (25 May 1964): p. 53⁴; Marshall Cohen, op.cit., p. 109.

¹³Noticably absent in Eros is any discussion of reason and comprehending consciousness. What has happened to it?

¹⁴Marcuse, Man, pp. 219-220.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 208.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 208.

¹⁸Jerry Cohen, "Critical Theory: The Philosophy of Marcuse," in New Left Review 57 (Sept./Oct., 1969): p. 41.

¹⁹Marcuse, Man, p. 256.

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A corollary of this is that some people know better than others just what freedom is. This idealism of Marcuse's perhaps accounts for some of those articles which of late have had such elitist overtones to them, such as "Repressive Tolerance." In an interesting critique, Carl Schneider suggests that Marcuse has made Reason God and Christ in the world; that history becomes the redemption of man through his acceptance of Christ (Reason). But the futility of Marcuse's redemption in Reason is revealed in the fact that time cannot be redeemed, and guilt cannot be eliminated (despite Marcuse's hope in the "Philosophic Interlude" in Eros and Civilization). Given the impossibility of redemption, therefore Marcuse must be seen as a spiritualist, a positivist (there is a Truth) and an authoritarian. Reason becomes unrealizable, becomes an ideal, and as such the world must always fall short of the Truth, and stand in need of help from holy fathers. See Carl Schneider, "Utopia and History," in Philosophy Today 12 (Winter 1968): pp. 236-245. Others also link Marcuse's abandonment of "history" with his elitism and authoritarianism. See Richard Goodwin, "The Social Theory of Herbert Marcuse: Which Side Is He On?" in The Atlantic 227:6 (June, 1971): pp. 68-85.

21

Marcuse, Man, p. xiii.

22

Marcuse, Liberation, p. 10.

23

Marcuse, Negations, p. xvi.

24

Marcuse, Liberation, p. 77.

25

Marcuse, "Culture," p. 64.

26

Ibid., p. 105.

27

Ibid., p. 107.

28

Ibid., p. 107.

29

Ibid., p. 106.

30

Ibid., p. 109.

31

Ibid., p. 110.

32

Ibid., p. 114.

33 See also Herbert Marcuse, "Political Preface, 1966," in Eros and Civilization, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955, 1966), p. xi.

³⁴ Marcuse, Liberation, p. vii.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. viii-ix.

³⁶ Herbert Marcuse, "Marcuse Defines His New Left Line," in New York Times Magazine (Oct. 27, 1968): p. 89.

³⁷ Marcuse, Liberation, p. 55.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 82.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 37.

⁴⁰ Peter Clecak faults Marcuse for his failure to honestly appraise the youth movement. See Clecak, op.cit., pp. 767-768.

CHAPTER IV

In this chapter I am going to examine Marcuse's concept of freedom for its qualities as a good social science concept. In order to do that, though, it will be necessary to specify the criteria for a good social science concept. Thus, I begin this chapter with a discussion of the functions of a concept in social science research, and offer the dialectical concept as being the model for a good social science concept. In the second part of the chapter I then judge Marcuse's concept of freedom according to how it measures up to the dialectical model.

I

1. One very important function of a concept is to provide a boundary to the scope of a researcher's interests. A concept is a set of characteristics,¹ and when a concept is related to social phenomena, it is those social characteristics which lead the researcher back into the possible universe of research. An example from political science may illustrate this point. Politics may be conceived as the reconciliation of conflicting interests. For the person using this concept, his scope of interest will include those institutions and processes which function to create a reconciliation of conflicting interests among a given group of actors. This research can be extended to any level of society, but at each level the subject will be considered separately; that is, there will be no attempt made at relating the levels of political activity to each other. Thus, we have small group politics, the politics of interest groups, etc. Problems which this researcher is likely to note are conditions, structures, and processes which prevent the successful achievement of a consensus. However, these problems are treated as so much

input, as so many given, which are not related in a systematic and dynamic way either to each or to the whole. The researcher may venture further to construct a theory of politics based on his concept of politics, and from that attempt to derive a concept of political man--the rational, active strategist and game theorist. On testing this model he may suffer some disconfirmation, so that he will either add to his concept making it rather cumbersome, or else he will make it an empty tautology. On the other hand, another social scientist may conceive politics as the concrete expression of the will-to-integrate of a dominant economic group. Much more is immediately brought within the scope of that researcher's interest, and the material is systematically related as well. Small groups then take on significance as part of the integrative process. The researcher becomes interested with the question of how a dominant class integrates a society to its own ends. This concept cuts across disciplines, crucially enlargening the scope of the field. At the same time, anomalies, such as men's apparent political irrationality are eliminated. The concept is neither vacuous, nor must additional conditions be added.

Concepts are particularly crucial to the social sciences, since the latter are so theory poor. The lack of theory throws the social scientist back in effect to non-theoretic formulations such as concepts.² Concepts play a dominant, rather than a subordinate role in contemporary social science.

2. Concepts define problems or contradictions in the phenomena to which they refer.³ These contradictions take on important theoretical and conceptual significance. Deviations in reality from the concept

are problematic; the solution to it may only be the complete revision of the concept. A deviation in behaviour from the conceptualized behaviour of political man may be the initial impetus to a radical transformation of a concept. Concepts are therefore crucial to the dialectic of discovery. The inability of a concept to contain the phenomenon it purports to represent leads to a process of further analysis and synthesis; that is, the dialectic process itself.⁴

3. Concepts are, in fact, the basic elements of theory--the lexicon, if you will. Concepts therefore have a significant role to play in formulating a valid theory. A poorly formed concept, when introduced into a theory, will weaken that theory to the extent that anomalies will appear in the theory when it is tested. A concept which is able to embrace the totality of the phenomenon to which it refers will not therefore, exclude other empirically relevant factors from the theory. In other words, if conceptual inadequacies are not immediately apparent, they will very soon become so when the theory fails to be validated in experience. Concepts are so important to theory that,

the introduction of a new concept into a theory by adding it to that theory's antecedent set of primitives is not actually to increment that theory; it is rather to replace the old theory with a new one. For one of the things that determines the identity of a theory is its set of primitives.⁵

Most theoretical concepts are primitive.⁶ Certainly political concepts such as politics, freedom, power, etc., are all primitive. Even when these concepts are operationalized or shown or pointed out, they have not been defined in terms of other concepts. Rather, only a meaning has been supplied to them; we can understand what concepts are, but we cannot define them by any other concept without being circular--without

finally saying that "a" is not "not-a."⁷ Thus, we must discover our concepts, rather than deduce them.

4. So far we have suggested that if good theories are to be formulated, adequate concepts must be found. But additionally, concepts are crucial in the social sciences insofar as we have no theory, which is why so-called systems theory, which is largely conceptual classificatory (like that of Parsons) is currently so important. In fact, though, it can be argued that concepts can be coterminous with theory, or even embrace it. In the former case, concepts function as models. Such is the case, for example, with Bohr's atom, which in effect is a model representing atomic theory.⁸ Models or concepts then function as teaching aids. It is easier to work with a model of an atom than to deal with the abstractness of mathematical formulae. But on occasions when models precede theory, then they embrace the theory. Thus the adoption of the systems concept prior to the elaboration of a theory has caused researchers to develop a theory within it (homeostasis, for example). As the scientific revolution progresses it is not so much theory that will change, as it will be our model-concepts. The theory will be patterned from a new concept. It is in this sense that Rudner writes that models belong to the context of discovery, and that they in fact become theory, "for it is easier to effect error-free deduction from the axioms and to think of a greater number of possible theorems" using models.⁹

Models are concepts. This is what we mean when we say that we have a concept of man, of history, or whatever. Thus, concepts have an incredible importance for the development of the human and/or social sciences.

5. Milton Rokeach, in his book, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values, distinguishes three components of beliefs. There is the cognitive which "represents a person's knowledge, held with varying degrees of certitude, of what is true or false."¹⁰ The second is the affective component, signifying:

that under suitable conditions the belief is capable of arousing affect of varying intensity centering around other objects (individuals or groups) taking...a stand with respect to the object of belief, or around the belief itself, when its validity is seriously questioned, as in an argument.¹¹

Finally, he distinguishes a behavioural component since "the belief, being a response disposition of varying threshold, must lead to some action when it is suitably activated."¹² Much energy has been spent in trying to control the role of affect in the research of academics, but no attention has ever been paid to the behavioural aspect, except by some critics of positivism.¹³ The point is that beliefs, such as ideal type concepts, carry with them predispositions to react in certain ways under certain conditions; thus a behavioural deviation from a positivist belief can motivate the holder of the belief to want to correct that deviation. Thus, if one's concept of man is as a self-choosing, self-creating individual, then one is inclined to react strongly against the knowledge that men do not act like that. Similarly, if one takes a Platonic view of man, then any upstarts from the men of brass would elicit one's condemnation and/or corrective action. Knowledge is a force in society--a force in itself, and not merely a tool. We seek to force reason on the world, and that attempt is made through the application of our concepts to the world. It is, in fact, true that our concepts can be tested only through action, or experimentation, with the

relevant universe. Thus, concepts, which are beliefs after all, have a major impact on the way in which we behave. Therefore, we must be extremely careful in choosing our concepts. For this reason, the social scientist can never escape values--his concepts must never transgress on basic human needs and values. A concept must embrace those needs and values; it must contain them within itself.

For the rest of this part of this chapter I shall examine the merits of the dialectical concept as a concept. This will be done in four sections. In the first section I shall argue that the dialectical method of concept formation eliminates contradictions in its own thought by recognizing them in reality. Secondly, I shall argue that the dialectic approach alone gives us a method of discovery. In the third section I shall make the point that the dialectical method is able to situate itself within its own method. Finally, I shall explore the method of validation for a dialectical concept.

1. The dialectical method begins with the belief that we cannot impose abstractions on reality, but rather that in any research we must begin with reality and try to explicate its inner, signifying meaning.¹⁴ This reverses the behavioural practice in which we signify first and then impose our interpretation upon the behaviour. The dialectic begins with externalities, and works inwards. The dialectical method also assumes that all reality must be understood as part of a totality; that the significance of an institution, a behaviour, an act, cannot be understood apart from the total social complex in which it happens. The task of the researcher is then to find out the relationship between the phenomenon and the totality, to present the complex mediations which

determine a situation, and which also give it a meaning--an outcome.

In many ways this approach does not seem to differ all that much from a structural-functional or even systems approach. Yet, there is a difference, and the difference involves the openness of the system. "All reality is a totality, both one and many, scattered or coherent, and open to its future, that is to its end."¹⁵ The major difference is that change is self-generated in the open system; change is not brought about by simply adjusting an institution to better serve its function, but rather by a total revolution which will change the function. The engine of change are the inherent contradictions in any system, as they are experienced by living people. While it is the case that nothing can be understood apart from a total situation, yet this does not mean that the totality is coherent. The whole may be torn by conflicts and contradictions. But these conflicts can only be understood fully when totalized. Canadian democracy, considered from one point of view--that of the nature of elections--is democratic; but from another point of view--that of the nature of the distribution of power--it is elitist, even ologarchical. Ordinary language analysts would then be confronted with the necessity of debating whether Canada is in fact a democracy or not, but only after first deciding what the essence of democracy is. Having decided upon the essence of democracy, and noted the shortcomings--if any--in Canadian democracy, they could then launch a reform movement. In fact, though, they have mistaken a phenomenal contradiction for the real one. The dialectical analyst, on the other hand, would immediately concede that Canada is a democracy, but would point out that all democracies of the Canadian variety are a sham. He would explain why this

should be the case, even must be the case. He would point out that the contradiction is rooted in the nature of Canadian society, that it is not merely a superficial and therefore correctable contradiction, but that it is a manifestation of a deeper antagonism. The importance of this type of conceptualization lies in its tremendous scope. The concept embraces all facets of human science. Additionally, fruitless argument is avoided by recognizing contradictions in the concept itself. Finally, the concept as a totality includes a theory--a theory of mediations.

The theory of mediations has been one of the most controversial of all the aspects of dialectical materialism. It is claimed for Marx that the economic system determines the rest of the social superstructure. However, as Louis Althusser points out, Marx emphasized that this is the case only in "the last instance."¹⁶ The relation between economy and superstructure is far more complex than a simple determinism. It is true that as long as we must work to exist, the way in which we make that existence is going to have a decided influence upon us. But our attitudes are also mediated by family, church, school, and other life experiences, literatures, and ideologies--a whole host of factors. Eventually, all of the above can be related back to the economic position of a given person, or group, but certainly behaviour is not directly determined. One of the tasks of the social scientist is to uncover those mediations in all their complexity.

The contradiction between Capital and Labour is never simple, but always specified by the historically concrete forms and circumstances in which it is exercised. It is specified by the forms of the superstructure;...specified by the internal and external historical situation which

determines it as on the one hand a function of the national past...and on the other as functions of the existing world context.¹⁷

Furthermore, dialectical materialism rejects the notion that the essence of the mediated superstructure is the economy.

This tacit identity...of the economic and political disappears in favour of a new conception of the relation of determinate instances in the infrastructure-superstructure complex which constitutes the essence of any social formation. Of course, these specific relations between infrastructure and superstructure still need theoretical elaboration and research. However, Marx has at least given us the two ends of the chain and has told us to find out what goes on between them: on the one hand determination in the last instance by the (economic) mode of production; on the other, the relative autonomy of the superstructures and their specific efficacy.¹⁸

Althusser points out that Marx was not interested in abstraction or theory, but in analyzing the "anatomy" of this world. This is the concern of the dialectical method.¹⁹

2. But even granted that the dialectical method emphasizes reality and content over abstractions and theory, and thus may be a better form of research than positivism, science must still be ordered; and even if it is ordered by concepts, these concepts are still abstractions. So two questions arise; can the dialectic give us our primitives; can the dialectic justify our choice of primitives?

Concepts do not drop out of heaven; they are made by men. Concepts belong to the context of discovery, and part of the purpose of this thesis is to provide a logic of discovery.²⁰ So here we seek an answer to the question; whence come our concepts? Knowledge in general, and abstractions in particular arise out of a dialectic between our needs and intentions, and the world;²¹ that is, our abstractions are related to our goals. The goals themselves may be complexly mediated such that the research goals of a "disinterested" scientist may in fact be unwittingly serving

someone else's needs--this mediation is one of the many that a social scientist must uncover. Yet even if our concepts are derived from our needs, this still does not justify our choosing such abstractions as freedom. Clearly this cannot be the case for a) not everyone experiences the same needs, and b) needs are frequently contradictory--the choice of one over the other excludes the latter from the possibility of fulfillment. The problem resolves itself into answering the question of whose needs do we satisfy? This problem is not all that different from the well recognized position that our values determine how we look at the world. In that case, the problem is to identify the right values.

However, the problem of needs is easier to deal with than the problem of values. The problem of "correct" concepts arises only when there is need conflict, so that we shall restrict ourselves to a consideration of that case. Dialectical materialism is superior to positivism in that it tries to situate its thought in the context of lived experience. Recognizing that knowledge is not "in itself", this method stresses the importance of identifying the motivating interest. But whose interest are we going to represent when we do social science research? To put it most succinctly, that of the rising class.²² History is progress through the resolution and surpassing of contradictions--a totalization of the totality. Lefebvre states that "action resolves vicious circles, or the contradictions of static thought. Practice is creative."²³ The rising class, by definition, experiences obstacles which makes it conscious of its needs. These needs are then rendered as interests--projects--to eliminate the obstacles, to transcend the contradictions. Need=project=transcendence. This is why social scientists cannot ignore

the purposes of social collectives for these purposes, rooted as they are in concrete and determined needs, are going to transform the world, change it, and create a new truth. If society is evolving, and if our science wants to understand the process of that evolution, then the concepts must be related to the need-fulfillment of the rising class.²⁴ Classical economics saw society in terms of obstacles to bourgeois development (free trade, markets, prices); in turn Marx conceptualized the same reality in terms--he felt--of the needs of the proletariat (alienation, surplus value, exploitation). Both Marx and the classical economists identified with the potential consciousness of the most consciously oppressed class.

The bourgeois have long been dominant and may yet be. The proletariat has not developed in its consciousness enough to catch up to Marx. This quite simply is because its needs have been met--there are no obstacles. Change comes from that group whose needs are being frustrated--the new intellectual class. Marx either mispredicted history, or else he mistook his own problems for those of the workers. Trade unionism seems to have satisfied the felt needs of the workers.

We are still left with a problem, however. It can be argued that one of the reasons capitalism has maintained itself for as long as it has is that intellectuals have conceptualized in accordance with the needs of the status quo. Knowledge is power, and this power has been used effectively to close off dissent and revolution; that is, it has been used to prevent the development of a radical political consciousness.²⁵ In other words, if knowledge itself can determine the course of developments, then there is no necessarily rising class; the scientists

themselves decide what that class shall be. To this one can only reply that the contradictions still exist in potential form; man is still alienated. Thus, the contradictions can be buried for a while, yet needs can never harmonize. The inflation problem coupled with rising unemployment reveals that there are still antagonisms in capitalism. So, once one class is firmly established in power, it is uncumbint upon social scientists to adopt the perspective of a new totalizing, that is signifying, class. As Sartre puts it,

Our historical task at the heart of this polyvalent world is to bring closer the moment when History will have only one meaning, when it will tend to be dissolved in the concrete men who will make it in common.²⁶

The final problem to be cleared up is, why class? This in itself could be the subject of a fairly lengthy debate, but here briefly is why. Needs and intentions determine our consciousness, and our truths. The manner in which we satisfy our needs to-day is through a market economy. In a market economy there are classes, which see the world differently. Since we are still very much fixated at the level of need satisfaction, therefore classes are of primary importance in analyzing social reality. As for identifying classes and class movements, this is why the social scientist must study society in its entirety--past and present. Otherwise, class movement will escape him.

3. The method must conform to the content. The content of the social sciences is man's relations to one another. The method must conform to the revolutionary freedom possibilities of man. The choice, therefore, is between a method based on human philosophy--that is, taken from "the standpoint of freedom and the human community, man and humanity,"²⁷ and a method which tries to impose rigidness and staticness on man and society.

In many ways the dialectic differs from positivism only in being able to situate itself within the social setting, rather than trying to pretend that it can abstract from it. But once the choice of the problem has been made, the two methods can co-exist quite comfortably.

The dialectical method of situation is sometimes called the analytic-synthetic, or the progressive-regressive method.²⁸ Essentially, as do all scientists, the dialectical social scientist begins by analyzing a situation--by discovering mediations, such as they are. Political socialization provides a classic example of how current social science research may be integrated into Marxist research. But, "analysis is not enough;... it is but the first moment in an effort of synthetic reconstruction."²⁹ Having analyzed a given phenomenon into its many mediations, it is necessary to work back from that to the intent--to the consciousness--of the actors.

4. Finally, we come to the problem of what constitutes proof, or the criteria of truth for the dialectical social scientist.

Given Kuhn's famous analysis of scientific revolutions, which he sees generally as struggles for the adoption of new paradigms in the face of resistance from the supporters of the status quo,³⁰ it would seem that one justification for adopting one approach or interpretation over another is the ability of the one to "take up" or explain the other.

Which (sociology) permits the understanding of the other as a social and human phenomenon, reveals its infrastructure, and clarifies, by means of an immanent critical principle, its inconsistencies and its limitations,³¹

writes Goldmann. He further points out that most positivist critics of Marx have either ignored the latter's epistemology, or misrepresented it,

thus indicating that, in fact, they are unable to explain his dialectic method using their own methods. Marxists, on the other hand, can explain positivism as a conservative force in the modern world, serving the interests of a strong, but nevertheless precariously situated, ruling class.³²

Further than this, a dialectical social scientist does not ignore his positivist counterparts, for, in fact, the latter are discovering truths, but they are unable to understand them. Thus, those doing work in political socialization do not relate it to the power structure--the economic structure--of a society, despite the fact that they do recognize it as an integrating force. The dialectician would want to explain--understand--socialization in terms of its repressive nature--adaptation to what, they would ask. Thus, no social scientist should ignore the work of his sister disciplines. One of the ways of getting at the truth is to effect a "synthesis of the elements of truth provided by the perspectives of several different social classes."³³ Or as Sartre puts it more succinctly,

The philosopher effects the unification of everything that is known, following certain guiding schemata which express the attitudes and techniques of the rising class regarding its own period and the world.³⁴

To say that a social scientist is synthesizing positivist findings, is also to say that he is accepting positivist methods, in their right place. Mediations can be established by the methods of positivist social science. In cases where concepts may be unamendable to strict positivist research, however, the dialectical social scientist can still attain truth by adhering to a set of rules that Goldmann offers:

1. He must be aware of his own values.
2. He must not fear his own heresy.
3. He must continually critique his own findings.
4. He must relate his own sociology, and that of others, to their social infrastructure, and also to the facts that they purport to explain.³⁵

Michael Polanyi also offers a rule for research. The truth of a concept, or any theory, lies in what Polanyi has referred to as the "tacit" area of our understanding. By tacit he means to suggest that the standards of verification or truth are developed intuitively to meet the problems which researchers must deal with. Truth must remain tacit, the standards of truth must remain an art, since any consistent critical attack on a truth standard will leave us with no truth standard at all.³⁶ To assert of something that it is true, "is an act of tacit comprehension, which relies altogether on the self-satisfaction of the person who performs it."³⁷ But Polanyi, like Goldmann, is unwilling to make the standard of truth simple satisfaction. Therefore, he suggests that we may have personal knowledge--knowledge which "transcends the disjunction between subjective and objective...(for) insofar as the personal submits to requirements acknowledged by itself to be independent of itself, it is not subjective; but insofar as it is an action guided by individual passions, it is not objective either."³⁸ To believe that something is true requires a commitment to its truth; "Truth is something that can be thought of only by believing it."³⁹ But what makes this commitment different from mere subjectivity or preference is the "universal intent" of the committed scientist.

The personal and the universal mutually require each other. Here the personal comes into existence by asserting universal intent, and the universal is constituted by being accepted as the impersonal term of the personal commitment.⁴⁰

This universal intent "establishes responsibility."⁴¹ "The freedom of the subjective person to do as he pleases is overruled by the freedom of the responsible person to do as he must."⁴² The belief that there is a truth, a sincere belief that there is a truth, "narrows down discretion to zero and issues at the same time in an innovation claiming universal acceptance."⁴³ So the truth of one's assertions lie in the honesty of the universal intent of the individual. Laing says much the same thing in Self and Others, when he suggests that there are two senses of truth; truth as in the correspondence theory of truth, and truth as in the statement, "He is telling the truth, or he is speaking truthfully," where we intend to refer to the sincerity of the affirmation, or the honesty of the belief of the speaker. Truth in this case means expressing in as honest a manner as possible one's beliefs, perceptions, and feelings.⁴⁴ So the two maxims of scientific research are 1) to be universal in intent--that is, try to establish truths which are comprehensible to as many people as is possible, and 2) do not knowingly deceive one's self or another as to one's experiences.

Insofar as truth exists for us, then the criteria of universality and honesty become crucial, for since truth becomes immanent to the experiences of each and everyone of us, to make a claim for truth is to make a claim to be expressing the truth that exists for everyone else in their projects and experience. In other words, one cannot say "A is true," verify it by some scientific method, and then insist on imposing this truth on everyone else, for the critical test is that others find the truth personally satisfying in terms of their needs and intents. Truth cannot be made to exist for another, but that is the danger of

truth in the correspondence sense, coupled with the acceptance of a scientific elite. So the social scientist must judge his work by its ability to explain satisfactorily the feelings, beliefs, experiences, needs, and problems of the human universe.

II

In this section I shall evaluate Marcuse's concept of freedom as a social science concept. A good social science concept should be a genuine abstraction from real social forces, and/or human intentions, or else derived from such forces and intents. Society can be understood as a totality organized behind a purpose or a goal. Secondly, a good concept must refer back to the total complexity of a society. A concept must not be an empirically sterile instrument, but have sufficient scope to integrate our knowledge of society about it. Thirdly, a good social science concept must, because of its importance for research and prescription, be situated within the context of human needs. Knowledge, which exists for us, must also exist, at least in part, for the satisfaction of human needs. Fourthly, a good social science concept must embrace all aspects of that which it wishes to describe, in order to avoid useless and sterile debate over just what one is looking at. It must expose itself to contradictions to try to resolve them, rather than to ignore them, leading to debates over the essence of that which the concept seeks to describe. Negative and positive freedom must both be accepted as definitions of freedom; and if they are at present contradictory, then they must be reconciled rather than one being rejected as a part of freedom--as a bad form of freedom. Fifthly, a good concept should point to, or even include, a theory of what it seeks to describe. From it, one should be able to generate hypotheses relating aspects of the concept to each other and to other social facts. Finally, a good social science concept should include some notions of the standards of truth and verifications to be used with it. We shall find that Marcuse's

concept of freedom measures up very well to these standards.

1. A Genuine Abstraction from Reality.

We have already discussed this question of the centrality of freedom in history in the previous chapter. Here it is only necessary to recall that Marcuse has based his concept of freedom on the combination of the growth of a radically disenchanted minority of nevertheless essential people in industrial society, with an awareness of the approaching crisis in the capitalist industrial world. On the basis of these subjective and objective factors, he feels that a revolution for freedom is a historical possibility. Furthermore, his concept of freedom is based on the real possibilities for man, in the sense that we do seem to have eliminated need and necessity in the western industrial world. Whether Marcuse is correct in pinning his hopes on the young would have to be the subject of another thesis, but the point is that he has rooted his concept in the real world, so that he does provide us with the grounds for his concept--grounds which allow for a dialogue. The fact that Marcuse exposes himself to criticism by basing his concept on his observations of the real world is a measure of the quality of his concept of freedom.

2. The Scope of the Concept

It is pretty clear from the discussion of Marcuse's concept of freedom that he sees freedom as being an attribute of the whole man--of man the thinker, and man the animal--and not just of man's mind. A man cannot be free within any given social structure, and he is certainly not free as long as necessity persists and is even perpetuated in a social and economic arrangement such as capitalism. Thus, a discussion of

freedom cannot be divorced from a study of the way in which an economic order perpetuates needs and misery; or the way in which a social order is antagonistic in practice, perpetuating the subject-object disunion; or the way in which men are alienated from their means of self-realization, unable to determine their own existence, but rather having it planned for them. Methods of education and indoctrination which prevent men from gaining a true consciousness of either their needs or their potentials, or of the society in which they live, must also be included in a discussion of freedom in the modern world.

Marcuse's complaint against the idealists (Kant) and Sartre is not that they are irrational or repressive in intent, but rather that they play down the importance of actual physical existence to human freedom. They do not see essence and existence as identical, or rather as inseparably linked to each other, but instead bifurcate man into mind and body, or being-for-itself and being-in-itself, calling the former essence and the latter existence, and make the difference an ontological fact; that is, a natural and necessary condition of human existence. Thus, the idealists can make the claim that men are always free in thought, and thus reconcile man's free existence to a repressive social order. The materialist, in contrast, is the first in recent time to see that essence is a real potential for existence--a negation of existing limits in accordance with existing forces and potentials. Essence is historical--the divorce of mind and body was a necessary historical precondition to restructuring the human condition (one had to draw back in order to leap)--and not a separate part of man. Essence is meant to be realized actually and materially.⁴⁵ In other words, Marcuse's precise complaint

against the idealists is that they fail to link up human freedom with actual social conditions. Clearly, therefore, to discuss freedom as Marcuse understands it, one must understand the effects of society on one's freedom.

In discussing Sartre's Being and Nothingness, Marcuse suggests that "the realization of human freedom appears, not in the res cogitans, the 'Pour-soi,' but in the res extensa, in the body as thing."⁴⁶ Marcuse criticizes Sartre for "glorifying" the freedom of the "pour-soi," which is only "one of the preconditions for the possibility of freedom--it is not freedom itself."⁴⁷ Sartre only really ever overcomes his concept of "transcendental liberty" when he discusses the "attitude désirante" which involves "the loss of the 'Pour-soi,' its reification in the 'corps vécu comme chair,'"⁴⁸ which in turn means that freedom is no longer transcendent, but a condition of man's existence.

The connection of freedom with happiness seems to particularly necessitate the relationship of freedom to a given mode of social existence. "In the principle of hedonism...the demand for the freedom of the individual is extended into the realm of the material conditions of life."⁴⁹ Man is happy through his person, through the realization of his potentials, and not through the simple conceptualization of his own happiness in his mind. "The unfolding of the personality must not be merely spiritual."⁵⁰ Man cannot be happy unless realizing his potentials through "social" and not individual or "indwelling" practice.⁵¹

Thus, it appears obvious that there is not much of a social nature which is not of relevance to Marcuse's concept of freedom. Social practices which related to the development or limitation of men's consciousness

are of as much importance as social institutions which limit men's free behaviour. All the social science disciplines, in fact all disciplines, can be integrated about the concept of freedom. The sciences are important in determining the extent to which men can enjoy freedom from necessity; psychology can inform the freedom theorist both about human needs, and the ways in which social structures and facts limit or promote the development of consciousness; sociology, political science, and economics can also both describe how social organizations act as a limit on man's free development, and at the same time indicate how men might live happier and freer existences. Much knowledge we now have of social institutions can be integrated about the concept of freedom.

In One Dimensional Man, which is, in a sense, Marcuse's most concrete "empirical" work, Marcuse demonstrates the power of his method and the scope of his concept of freedom, in that he is able to relate multiple aspects of an active society--welfare statism, culture, economy, scientific research, philosophic analysis--together; he tries to reveal the inner unity of all these various social facts--their unity lying in their repressiveness.⁵²

How can a society which gives most of its members a luxurious standard of living, requires less and less work of them, has abolished many back-breaking jobs, and is likely to eliminate more in the future, which provides free education and opportunity for so many of its children, which is the living embodiment of so many cherished political freedoms, which has gone a long ways towards eliminating necessity and coercion; how can such a society be called repressive? Some critics of One Dimensional Man stop right here, for to them, Marcuse's thesis that men are

unfree is invalidated by the above facts.⁵³ Marcuse, I believe, is willing to concede that necessity has been overcome by technological society, but in terms of all the other aspects of freedom, technological society is conceivably more unfree than many other societies. Reason and truth are subverted by positivism, formal logic, and linguistic analysis; self-consciousness, or the awareness of one's freedom is eliminated through manipulation, through the development of false consciousness; the union of subject and object is a "bad" one; men are unaware of their true needs and potentials, and hence cannot realize them; happiness is a sham; alienation is total; self-determination is impossible with the loss of the "inner" self; limiting social structures exist everywhere in one's life; and community is absent.

Marcuse begins his study of industrial society with a discussion of the manipulation of men's needs. Men develop in and against a social order in accordance with their felt needs. Change comes about only when men "live in need of changing their way of life."⁵⁴ The "choice" is made in accordance with men's awareness of their own needs. A social system can therefore maintain itself if a) the needs of men are not such as to require a change in the society, and b) the society is able to satisfy the needs. It is precisely both these requirements which technology allows western society to fulfill. On the one hand, modern means of persuasion ensure that people's needs are manipulated such that they feel the need to buy whatever it is that the producer wants to sell.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the society ensures that men will not escape the consumption syndrome; they will not see the "good life" as anything other than an ever higher standard of living. Beyond that, men are told how to enjoy their purchases--

a car is a status symbol, a thing of beauty, anything but safe or functional. The reactions, the uses of products, are sold with the products. This ensures waste, and also limits men's awareness of possibilities to only those which they are told about.⁵⁶ The needs of men are therefore becoming the needs of the "vested interests," of the social whole.⁵⁷ Since, "the most effective and enduring form of warfare against liberation is the implanting of material and intellectual needs that perpetuate obsolete forms of the struggle for existence."⁵⁸ and since technological society is certainly able to deliver the goods,⁵⁹ it follows that men are not eager for change, and that insofar as contemporary society is indeed repressive, the consumer is content to stay in that condition.

But if a man's needs are satisfied, then how can he be called unfree; and how can the society which satisfies them be called repressive? It is simply because the needs are neither self-determined, nor expressive of the individual's own potentials. Marcuse again makes the distinction between true and false needs, but this time with a slight difference. The falsity of most men's needs now lies not in their nature, but in their origin. "'False' (needs) are those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests."⁶⁰ Their falsity lies in someone else's determining them for us in their own interests. The only needs which "demand" satisfaction, and which therefore, others may force us to satisfy, are the vital needs--food, clothing, and shelter.⁶¹ All other needs, however, must be determined by each individual on his own. True needs are self-determined needs.⁶²

In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves, but only in the last analysis; that is, if and when they are free to give their own answer.⁶³

Marcuse does not want needs of any sort imposed on anyone; the freedom he speaks for here would be the freedom to be left alone. Marcuse expressly rejects even the possibility of a benevolent philosopher-king. Needs are becoming personal, rather than universal; individually determined by each man, rather than part of the make-up of every man; spontaneously determined rather than pre-determined.

Individual, spontaneous needs can only develop in a consciousness which is itself independent, unique, and non-determined by the environment. There must be this "inner" freedom of mind before men can be free in the development of their own needs and potentials; it is "the private space in which man may become and remain 'himself.'"⁶⁴ But, Marcuse claims,

today this private space has been invaded and whittled down by technological reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim the entire individual.... The result is, not adjustment, but mimesis: an immediate identification of the individual with his society and, through it, with the society as a whole.⁶⁵

In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse mentions the "corporealization of the ego,"⁶⁶ by which he meant to suggest that men are increasingly capable of only "frozen traits and gestures, produced at the appropriate occasions and hours."⁶⁷ This in part is induced by advertisements which instruct people on how to react, but television and schools are the chief means of rendering men's consciousness frozen and stereotyped. Everything and everyone is engineered en masse. This trait is further accentuated by the language style of the media, the uses made of "high" culture, and the

use of operational definitions in place of ideas in philosophy and the sciences. We shall return to these points later.

With the "corporealization of the ego" a terrifying subject-object union is completed, and alienation becomes total. For indeed subject and object are become one, but the subject has been absorbed by the object. Man defines himself in terms of his possessions; he measures himself according to his fulfillment of societal needs. The subject and object are not a unity of distinctive entities; but rather, the latter submerges the former. Thus, too, alienation is complete, for man allows himself to be dominated not only by objective necessity, but by his own social creations.

The economy is unified; worker and manager stand side by side. They enjoy the same things; they are both happy with what they are getting; they both believe in the future of their enterprise. Marcuse feels that the labouring class is no longer revolutionary, largely because they are possessed of a "false" consciousness. They conceive false needs; they see the managers and owners as other than they are (exploiters); they fail to understand how their society is destroying them as individuals; they seem to be unable to experience the terror of an almost inevitable nuclear war; they see those who are free, and who seek their welfare as well, as the Enemy. But such a false consciousness cannot be accounted for by propaganda and manipulation alone; it does reflect a real unity in the technological era, and a real existence for the worker. Physical, painful labour is disappearing. Mental strain replaces physical illness as the occupational illness. Assembly line work can even have a pleasure in its rhythm. Thus the sharp edge--the real need--for revolution has been eliminated in the factory itself. Work is no longer

a threat to life; it may even be pleasant.⁶⁹ The labourer is also being assimilated to the white collar class, which is notoriously promanagement. Salaries replace piece rates, and exploitation disappears behind a screen.⁷⁰ The workers are beginning to identify with management; they feel that they are all part of a team. They perceive no insoluable differences.⁷¹ Finally, even the owners seem now to be managed. Rationalism in business; technology; efficiency seem to be the ends of management, and not profits. The contradiction between labour and capital, which is manifest in profits, is thus dissolved in technological reason.⁷² Even Marcuse seems to believe that technology--domination--and not profits or exploitation is the end of modern society.

Marcuse, after indicating why he thinks no one feels the need to be free, then continues on to indicate why no one wants to be free, or why no one can even conceive of the possibility of their not being free. Quite simply, visions of alternate possibilities have been eliminated in man and society.

Art was, Marcuse feels, originally critical in its function. "High" culture, although a privilege of the few, was antagonistic to reality; it constituted "another dimension of reality" by virtue of its "oppositional, alien and transcendent elements."⁷³ Ultimately, art was "la promesse de bonheur."⁷⁴ But the critical bite of art has been lessened in three ways. Classic art has been popularized; as such, it is now sold as "classical" reading material; it is meant to be read as a classic, a titillating bonbon of literature, rather than as a damning indictment of the society. Of course, too, the classics are not able to speak to us directly, since the conditions to which they refer may no longer exist. Thus, the criticisms of the classics may be lost on us

in any case. But through their popularization, through their use in advertisements, through their status content, one is even now indoctrinated on how to understand the classics. Preferably, in the academic world in particular, one responds to a classic for its technique rather than for its message. Secondly, and related to this, as our language becomes more concrete, the classics lose their relevancy. Thus, when love or freedom have become to mean sex and free enterprise, the use of these same words in the classics in any other sense will be lost on the reader. Any other use of freedom or love will hopelessly confuse him.⁷⁵ Finally, modern art, or one variety of it, has become more realistic. It reproduces society, rather than transcending it. At best, it instills a feeling of helplessness and despair; at worst, it ensures resignation. In neither case does it get to the roots of the problem and/or its possible resolution.⁷⁶

Marcuse also discusses repressive desublimation--or the manipulation of happiness--in this book. Society permits controlled desublimation of both the life and the death instincts. Sex is now permitted, or at least genital sex between male and female. In fact, it is positively encouraged through stories, advertisements, television screenplays, modern folk heros, etc. Sex is everywhere; for Madison Avenue it seems to have become everything. It truly is the triumph of the therapeutic--a controlled remission which permits an individual to sustain an otherwise repressive existence.⁷⁷ But the sex must be normal. By focussing on the demand for the liberation of just one thing--genital sexuality--and by permitting its satisfaction, society is again manipulating men in their needs. Men think themselves to be free, simply because they can satisfy

a socially manipulated obsessive need. The result has been to almost reduce men and women to objects of conquest for each other. Love--a free union of equals--has been perverted into just another technique. Furthermore, insofar as in previous periods the super-ego was so censorious of free sexual gratification, and insofar as men have now been absolved from that guilt, Marcuse believes that men now feel guiltless about everything. They have a happy consciousness; their consciences are pure. As a result, they feel easy in ignoring the crimes of their society.⁷⁸ This argument, however suggestive, is weak, though, for the super-ego, once constituted, rests only on continued libidinal repression for its existence, and Marcuse feels that, in fact, men are more repressed than ever, meaning that the super-ego should be stronger than ever.⁷⁹ The Happy Consciousness must be the product of something other than sexual liberation, which is the false consciousness induced by modern language. But Marcuse's treatment of repressive desublimation--of sexual liberation--indicates the power of his concept as contrasted to that offered by linguistic analysts, logical positivists, and behavioural scientists. For the latter group, sexual liberation would be freedom, insofar as it is a liberation from a specific repression. Marcuse would not entirely disagree; but he points out that in the total context of manipulated needs and sexuality, sexual liberty can be even more repressive than sexual repression, for the "false" liberation obscures the real binds on men; it makes them contented with their manipulated existences. A sexually frustrated person, on the other hand, would be a threat to the entire system. Men, in demanding freedom, would challenge the whole technical-manipulative apparatus, for the men themselves do not experience just

sexual repression, but repression generally, of which sexual repression is but an indicator. Freedom has a "transitive" meaning; it goes "beyond descriptive reference to particular facts...into the processes and conditions on which the respective society rests, and which enter into all particular facts, making, sustaining, and destroying the society."⁸⁰ Freedom cannot be identified abstractly; it must be seen in the context of a total society, which gives meaning to individual freedoms. Sexual liberty must be seen in a societal context as a controlled remission, as a therapeutic device, rather than as real freedom. And sexual freedom must be seen in the total complex of the aspects of freedom for what it is--a manipulated and false need which tends to subvert men's consciousness, rather than to expand them, in the present social context.

Marcuse believes that one of the great triumphs of twentieth century technology has been to subvert consciousness through the destruction of transcendent and transitive concepts.

The concepts which comprehend the facts and thereby transcend the facts are losing their authentic linguistic representation. Without these mediations language tends to express and promote the immediate identification of reason and fact, truth and established truth, essence and existence, the thing and its function.⁸¹

In other words, concepts such as freedom are pre-defined for the public in such a way that they are identical with the facts that already exist (freedom is sexual liberation; freedom is free enterprise; freedom is the United States), and thus are uncritical of the facts; or else, concepts are reduced to "atoms", as in the Hawthorne experiment, so that criticisms are specific, rather than general and revolutionary.

Words and concepts tend to coincide, or rather the concept tends to be abolished by the word. The former has no other

content than that designated by the word in the publicized and standardized usage, and the word is expected to have no other response than the publicized and standardized behavior (reaction). The word becomes cliché and, as cliché, governs the speech or the writing; the communication thus precludes genuine development of meaning.⁸²

Again, the repressive effects of this development can be understood only in terms of a complex definition of freedom, which emphasizes the need for an "inner" critical faculty, a comprehending consciousness, as a part of freedom. For manipulated language hardly seems to be a loss of any specific freedom at all. But in a repressive society, the elimination of criticism through the redefinition of words, is itself a repressive act. For most contemporary philosophers, the ability to redefine words would probably be taken as a mark of freedom, rather than repression.

But it is not only that concepts are being redefined and purified of their transcendent intent that bothers Marcuse. The actual style of communication promotes unthinking acceptance of the status quo as well. Sentences are compressed into hyphenated expressions, which proclaim "the reconciliation of opposites by welding them together in a firm and familiar structure."⁸³ It is as if no time is to be allowed for the mind to grasp and consider what has been said. The use of the verbal media probably promotes this, insofar as it is always possible to read at one's own pace, while it is impossible to get an announcer to slow down, or to repeat himself. The result is hypnotic and incantory. The mention of a word automatically conjures up its standard attributes. No tension is allowed to exist in the sentence. The terror of a hydrogen bomb is eliminated in such phrases as "low yield, tactical, clean, nuclear weapon." Clean, low yield, and tactical all suggest relative

harmlessness, while nuclear suggests a holocaust. It is as if the nuclear had been stripped of its mass murder connotation, and replaced with the image of a World War II bomb. But there is no space nor time permitted for a person to say, "Just a minute! How can a nuclear weapon be harmless?"⁸⁴

Modern technological societies greatest triumph, however, has been more than just eliminating men's consciousnesses, as well as limiting their behaviour; it has subverted Reason itself, and those who are the servants of reason and freedom--the philosophers and scientists. Reason has been lost.

"Reason=Truth=Reality"⁸⁵=the unfolding of an object's ends, or potentials. Reason was originally concerned with distinguishing "what is true and what is false insofar as truth (and falsehood) is primarily a condition of Being, of Reality--and only on this ground a property of propositions."⁸⁶ Reason, in other words, was concerned with discerning true being, with passing judgement on existence, rather than on abstract propositions. Reason was concerned with making judgements of the nature of "attributing (p) to (S)," but only "insofar as it pertains to (S), as a property of (S)."⁸⁷ It was not a question of whether (p) could formally be attributed to (S), but whether in fact it was in the nature of (S) for (p) to be attributed to it. It was a synthesis of mind and matter; it was an act of intuition--"the result of methodic-intellectual mediation. As such it is the mediation of concrete experience."⁸⁸

However, logic as we know it today is purely formal.

Thought is indifferent towards its objects. Whether they are mental or physical, whether they pertain to society or nature, they become subject to the same general laws of organization, calculation, and conclusion--but they do so as fungible signs

or symbols, in abstraction from their particular 'substance.' This general quality (quantitative quality) is the precondition of law and order--in logic as well as in society--the price of universal control.⁸⁹

Formal logic changes the emphasis from substance to secondary qualities--to the manipulable, measurable, quantitative attributes of a substance.

Formal logic is concerned with what can be made of something, rather than with what it is. Logic is identical with mathematics--it seeks to reduce a substance to isolated and independent, and thus, manipulable, attributes. It is a logic of control, of manipulation--verbal and mathematical--rather than a logic of essence, or Eros. Formal logic is sterile; most of the great political philosophies have been developed a-logically. "In their main efforts, neither the idealist nor the materialist, neither the rationalist nor the empiricist schools seem to owe anything to it."⁹⁰

Reason and truth thus become identifiable with "workable manipulation," with correct transformation, with process rather than Being. Logic has triumphed, both in the sciences and in philosophy, where the philosophers are busily hunting down a-logical words.

MacIntyre criticizes Marcuse on his critique of logic. The main thrust of his criticism is that logic is nothing other than an abstraction from ordinary discourse. "What logic does is to articulate and make explicit those rules which are in fact embodied in actual discourse."⁹¹ Logic can therefore not be pernicious, because it is natural. Well, certainly no one would disagree that logic has its merits, and one of its merits is to prevent people from making contradictory assertions. But logic is a purified form, not of language in its entirety, but of mathematics or scientific discourse. Wittgenstein pointed out that there was more than one language, and that language was by no means a

true reflection of the world.⁹² Logic grew out of an attempt to manipulate the world; it grew out of mathematics, which in turn grew out of agriculture. So logic is not pure-born, but exists for us as a means of conquest, of deducting consequences from actions. Logic is therefore not appropriate to anything but manipulation. Religion, political concepts, morality, philosophy, and ontology all belong outside logic. Marcuse's complaint is in fact that logic has extended its methods, through logical positivism in the sciences, and linguistic analysis in philosophy, to these other areas, and has thus undermined their critical function. MacIntyre seems to have missed the point that logical analysis is only appropriate to certain types of discourse--namely, scientific-mathematical discourses.

Marcuse reserves his sharpest criticisms for the language analysts, who in turn have easily been his bitterest critics. Marcuse argues that linguistic analysis is therapeutic, in the sense that it removes the critical transitivity of philosophic concepts by reducing them to ordinary words.⁹⁴ In this enterprise, they are in league with the mass media. Linguistic analysis is of two sorts; one variety seeks to reduce concepts to meaningful terms--that is, in terms of ordinary language; the other variety seeks to reduce a concept to its logical atomic components. In doing so, philosophy becomes uncritically accepting of the status quo. On the one hand, ordinary language is to a large extent a functional language, rather than a conceptual one; that is the language has certain specific behavioural references built into it. Additionally, because of manipulation, ordinary language has been even further impoverished in even its conceptual terms. To analyze freedom in terms of

what the "man-on-the-street" means by it, is to find out what society wants it to mean. The "ordinary" concept of freedom is thus non-critical of the society.

Philosophic terms must be other than the ordinary ones in order to elucidate the full meaning of the latter. For the established universe of discourse bears throughout the marks of the specific modes of domination, organization, and manipulation to which members of a society are subject.⁹⁵

That logical analysis which, on the other hand, only wishes to make a concept meaningful by giving it a precise behavioural reference is guilty of another fault. Philosophic concepts are dialectical concepts; they are more than all the possible "atoms" of behavioural meaning that can be given to them. Freedom is more than sexual freedom. For anyone to analyze a concept properly, they must see it as a complex concept, which may be understood only in relation to a societal totality. The study of meaning automatically therefore leads to a study of society, and a critique of it.⁹⁶ Philosophy does have the task of clarifying meaning, but not by reducing complex words to simple atoms, but by elucidating the complexity of the concept in terms of a total complex social whole. The totality of a concept may well be inexpressable, insofar as the concept is a rebellion. To say that I want to be free is to say that I want to be rid of the forces which appear to be managing my life; of the anxieties which I experience. A person wants to lash out at the total situation; as such, it is impossible to be thoroughly precise. One can only be precise with trivial words, or else one ends up with a trivial version of a complex word. Marcuse's complaint against philosophic analysis is precisely that--it is trivial. MacIntyre provides no answer to that charge; he fails to admit the possibility that linguistic analysis just may be inappropriate for complex words. One critic

of Marcuse, a linguistic analyst himself, takes Marcuse to task for misinterpreting Wittgenstein, but agrees that Marcuse has legitimate complaints to make against those who have put Wittgenstein to conservative use; that is, those who would abolish discussion altogether about those things which Wittgenstein said could not be discussed in terms of a calculus style of language.⁹⁷

Thus, reason has been subverted. Formerly critical, it has become therapeutic; once transcendent, it has become reconciliatory. With reason itself attacked, it seems that contemporary western society has guaranteed its own permanence.

From this brief review, it is plain that there is not much in society that is not of relevance to Marcuse's concept of freedom. It is in its scope that its greatest strength lies.

3. Situated in the Context of Human Needs

Given Marcuse's concept of freedom, it is obvious that insofar as freedom exists beyond necessity, and may even be realizable within the realm of necessity, Marcuse situates his concept in the context of satisfying human needs, whatever they may be. For Marcuse, the measure of the quality of any society is the extent to which it satisfies human needs and potentials. "The community that conforms to reason's standards must be conceived 'not as a limitation on the individual's true freedom, but as an expression of it.'"⁹⁸ Clearly Marcuse's concept of freedom, given his definition of it, includes, in fact advocates and requires, the satisfaction of human needs.

4. The Complexity of the Definition

Marcuse's concept of freedom embraces all possible aspects of freedom. A person's freedom is simply not complete unless all the aspects

included in his definition are satisfied. Thus, he avoids many debates which centre about the definition of freedom, simply by including all definitions and revealing their inner and necessary connections. Furthermore, because of the complexity of his concept, it cannot happen that what he describes as freedom, will, under certain social conditions, become unfreedom. Using Berlin's categories of negative and positive freedom, for instance, Marcuse obviously considers both aspects to be important to freedom. Freedom is:

the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the truth, the power to shape reality in line with its potentialities. The fulfillment of these ends belongs only to the subject who is master of his own development, and who understands his own potentialities.... Freedom...presupposes reason, for it is comprehending knowledge alone, that enables the subject to gain and to wield the power.⁹⁹

The free man must be master of his own development (negative freedom), but his development must be guided by reason, or a knowledge of his true potentialities (positive freedom). Negative freedom by itself may be unfreedom if people's consciousnesses are impaired or limited by a society. Man may be free in a political, or even a social, way, and thus enjoy negative freedom, but they may be unfree through the manipulation of their consciousnesses. The danger of emphasizing positive freedom is that it can in fact be used to justify a philosopher-king or a racist dictator. Men are only free when they are fulfilling their own unique potentials. Men cannot be coerced to be free. Thus, negative freedom is a necessary complement to positive freedom in order to give a good definition of freedom. Either one by themselves can turn into their opposite. Marcuse's concept of freedom, including as it does so many aspects of freedom, is simply a better reflection of freedom itself

in the everyday world, then any of them considered alone.

5. Freedom Hypotheses

If all the aspects of freedom discussed above were put into the form of hypotheses of the sort "if men acted in accordance with reason, then they are freely," one would have at least eleven hypotheses on freedom for examination and consideration. Unfortunately, many of the aspects of freedom are not subject to standard types of validation. New methods of hypothesis testing will have to be developed, the most important of which would seem to be an honest reflection on the condition of man in society, including that of the examiner himself. But methodology is not my concern here. In addition to the hypotheses immediately generated from the concept, the concept, when applied to actual social conditions will, as a good theory should, suggest hypotheses and explanations. The aspects of freedom rendered as hypotheses, and proven, would, in fact, constitute a theory of freedom which could then be applied to any society to explain how its institutions and practices promoted or limited one or all of the aspects of freedom considered in the concept. Thus, for instance, on One Dimensional Man, which is Marcuse's most scientific work, things like modern language usage, positivist developments in the social sciences, linguistic analysis in philosophy are all shown to be limiting to freedom through the second aspect of freedom--consciousness of freedom--and the fourth aspect--awareness of one's potentials--and may even be undermining reason itself. Thus, Marcuse's concept of freedom contains a theory as well, which may be applied to any society to explain why people are, or are not, free. Marcuse himself does not do this very often, nor does he really indicate what his methods of

verification are. But Marcuse's theory would certainly enable one to describe a society and its effects upon human freedom, to explain the effects, and finally even allow one to predict whether a given social system would, or would not, maximize freedom, or whether a given public policy would lead to greater or lesser freedom. Marcuse's work is in part an attempt at strategy, or laying the groundwork for the development of strategy, on what must be done in order to achieve human freedom. This task can only be accomplished with a good theory, which is why the theory of freedom implicit in the concept of freedom is so important. Marcuse's notorious essay on "Repressive Tolerance", for example, is an attempt to explain how tolerance--freedom of speech--can become a weapon or instrument of repression in terms of his own concept of freedom, and in the context of contemporary social and political conditions.¹⁰⁰

6. Truth Standards

Marcuse's failure to indicate his criteria for the truth of his assertions is one of his major faults. However, he does not leave the question of criteria completely untouched. The truth of any concept, for instance, lies in its being a "determinate negation." Freedom as a concept can be verified according to its determinateness as a negation. This means that any concept of human freedom must be a real possibility based on the present state of affairs. Marcuse suggests that:

What men can be in a given historical situation is determinable with regard to the following factors: the measure of control of natural and social productive forces, the level of organization of labour, the development of needs in relation to possibilities of their fulfillment, the availability, as material to be appropriated, of a wealth of cultural values in all areas of life.¹⁰¹

In addition, we can use our truth standards as developed earlier in this chapter. Certainly Marcuse intends to be universal. He intends that everyone should be able to reflect upon their existences, and find the same truths he is pronouncing. He claims to have no inherent special insights; nor does he intend to speak for a special class of men, except for those who may be considered to be universal men. He defends the interests of all men as men, and claims no special privileges for anyone. Secondly, he is able to explain many social phenomenon, including the methodologies and outlooks of those who take a view opposed to his. The analysis in One Dimensional Man shows his ability to explain other trends and movements counter to his own. Thirdly, he is certainly aware of his own values. Fourthly, he obviously does not fear his own heresy. Fifthly, he does revise his opinions, and even changes his approach on some questions (needs, for example) which would tend to indicate that he does criticize his own work. As to his honesty, that is impossible to answer. The final point to make is that he makes clear just what is the source of his judgement on society, and thus exposes himself to criticism and debate, which in the final analysis is the only standard of truth.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

¹R. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 18.

²Ibid., p. 40.

³N. Georgescu-Roegen, Analytical Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 12.

⁴T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), see chapter VIII.

⁵Rudner, op.cit., p. 19. A primitive concept is a concept which cannot be further reduced to another concept. See Rudner, p. 14.

⁶Ibid., p. 23.

⁷Ibid., p. 20.

⁸Ibid., p. 24.

⁹Ibid., p. 25

¹⁰M. Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968), p. 113.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 113-114.

¹²Ibid., p. 114.

¹³Marcuse, for one, emphasizes this behavioural aspect of thought and knowledge. He points out that for the Greeks, "truth commits and engages human existence. It is the essentially human project. If man has learned to see and know what really is, he will act in accordance with the truth. Epistemology is in itself ethics, and ethics is epistemology." Marcuse, Man, p. 125.

¹⁴H. Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), pp. 86-87.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 108.

¹⁶ L. Althusser, "Contradiction and Overdetermination," in C. Oglesby, ed., The New Left Reader (New York: Grove Press, 1969), p. 79.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁹ A similar point is made by W.G. Runciman when he suggests that "the proper function of social science is not prediction, but diagnosis." W.G. Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 17.

²⁰ Mannheim poses a similar problem for the sociology of knowledge to solve; namely, to uncover the "irrational foundation of rational knowledge." K. Mannheim Ideology and Utopia, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1936), p. 1.

²¹ Supra, p. 57. See Mannheim, op.cit., p. 4.

²² Mannheim, op.cit., p. 45.

²³ Lefebvre, op.cit., p. 50.

²⁴ Mannheim, op.cit., p. 43.

²⁵ This at least is the thesis of Marcuse in One Dimensional Man.

²⁶ Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. H. Barnes (New York: Random House Vintage, 1968), p. 90.

²⁷ L. Goldmann, The Human Sciences and Philosophy (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), p. 79.

²⁸ Analytic-synthetic is in Lefebvre, op.cit., pp. 102-103. The progressive-regressive method is explained in Sartre, Search, chapter 3.

²⁹ Sartre, Search, p. 27.

³⁰ Kuhn, op.cit.

³¹ Goldmann, op.cit., p. 52.

³² The dialectical method of concept formation and analysis can be used to explain both the reason for positivism, and more importantly, it can explain positivism as but one moment in the process of man's discovery

of himself in the universe. Positivism subjects the world to scrutiny as "other", but fails to make the leap to see the world as "intent." The positivist rejects the dialectician as a fuzzy thinker, or a metaphysician. He cannot explain the dialectician.

³³ Goldmann, op.cit., p. 58.

³⁴ Sartre, Search, p. 5.

³⁵ Goldmann, op.cit., pp. 60-61.

³⁶ M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 254.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 254.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 300.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 305.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 308.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 309.

⁴² Ibid., p. 309.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 309.

⁴⁴ R.D. Laing, Self and Others (London: Tavistock Publications, 1961), pp. 110-111.

⁴⁵ Marcuse, "Essence," p. 67.

⁴⁶ Marcuse, "Existentialism," p. 312.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 330.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 331.

⁴⁹ Marcuse, "Hedonism," p. 162.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 184.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 190.

⁵² Marcuse, Man, p. xvi.

⁵³ Marshall Cohen, op.cit., pp. 108-110; Julius Gould, op.cit., pp. 68-74; MacIntyre, op.cit., p. 69.

⁵⁴ Marcuse, Man, p. xiv.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. xiv.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 5.

⁶² Ibid., p. 6.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 6.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 10.

⁶⁶ Marcuse, Eros, pp. 93-94.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 94.

⁶⁸ Marcuse, Man, p. 11.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 24-27.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 27-29.

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 29-31.

⁷² Ibid., pp. 31-32.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 57.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 210.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 68.

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 77-78.

⁷⁷ Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1966). See the introduction and chapters 1-4.

⁷⁸ Marcuse, Man, p. 76.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 71-80.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 106.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 85.

⁸² Ibid., p. 87.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 89.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 89.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 123.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 124.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 130.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 126.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 136.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 139.

⁹¹ MacIntyre, op.cit., p. 76.

⁹² David Pears, Wittgenstein (Bungay: Fontana/Collins, 1971), pp. 133-134.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 172.

⁹⁴ Marcuse, Man, p. 170.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 193.

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp. 198-199.

⁹⁷ Jerry Cohen, op.cit., p. 40.

⁹⁸ Marcuse, Reason, p. 55.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁰⁰ Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," pp. 81-117.

¹⁰¹ Marcuse, "Essence," p. 72.

CHAPTER V

In this concluding chapter, I want to take up the question of Marcuse's positive category in his concept of freedom. For various reasons, I think that it is best eliminated. For one thing, many of the proofs offered for the positive aspects listed in Chapter I are either poor, or not given at all. In light of the criticisms that can be made against them, they need justification. Secondly, the claim that reason is able to dictate that men's truths are the fulfillment of their potentialities is unfounded for we find that choice precedes reason, and that therefore there is no necessary truth about human being. But to say that men have choice is not to undermine the case for the union of reason with negative freedom, for reason is necessarily negating, and this provides the grounds for choice. Thirdly, the positive concept of freedom seems to contradict the negative concept, so that one of them has to go. The negative concept seems better simply because it better suits the idea that man is a negating, transcending conscious being, that causes the dialectic to exist simply because he never knows himself what he is going to do before he does it. Related to this point is that Marcuse's positive concept of freedom seems to be positivist, rather than dialectical. It has the ring of Plato to it. Men have potentials which are knowable, and make them happy when realized. This is exactly the same view that modern liberals hold--they create systems to respond to human needs. Democracy and political liberties do not seem to be too popular among those that equate freedom with the realization of one's potentials. And again, if men are endowed with a content then how can dialectic ruptures occur in history? Fifthly, Marcuse's attempt to

develop the positive side in Eros and Civilization was a failure in that he could not reconcile needs and freedom without making needs indeterminate. Finally, in One Dimensional Man, Marcuse reveals himself to be more concerned with the process of making choices, rather than with the realization of human potentials. In this book, he seems to realize that the crucial dimension for freedom is the choice to be free.

But if we drop the positive aspect of freedom, we are still left with a healthy concept of freedom. Freedom becomes, then, man's constant decision to choose to be. He may choose to remain what he is, but that is freedom only if he is aware that he could be other than he is. Thus freedom requires reason, in the sense that a man must be able to comprehend his situation so as to realize what one can be. Man must at least always be beyond himself in thought. But if a man chooses to be other than he is, he must be allowed to realize that choice without hindrance from others; this is the truth of Marcuse's positive emphasis. Men need not realize their potentials to be free--they need only be aware of them--but they are not free if they are not able to realize their potentials, after choosing to do so. These two aspects of freedom--freedom as choice, and freedom as the power to realize a choice--form a concept of freedom which is still powerful philosophically, and in particular it makes an outstanding example as a social science concept.

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
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
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
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
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